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n the United States, a criminal defendant can show himself to be not 
guilty of the crime of which he is accused by showing that he was “en-
trapped” by agents of the government. Entrapment is not merely a miti-
gating factor to be considered in sentencing a defendant who is acknowl-
edged to be guilty of a crime; it is not treated in the law in the way, for in-
stance, a defendant’s poverty is often treated, as providing reason to give a 
guilty defendant a lighter sentence than an equally guilty but rich defendant, 
who also stole for money. Rather, entrapment constitutes a complete de-
fense: An entrapped defendant is simply not guilty of violating the law under 
which he is being prosecuted. Those who think that there would be some-
thing wrong with a legal system that did not allow the entrapment defense 
have, in the background of their thoughts, a particular picture of the condi-
tions under which it is appropriate to hold a person legally responsible for his 
behavior, conditions that are absent when that person has given in to certain 
temptations supplied by the government. They accept, that is, however im-
plicitly, a theory of legal responsibility under which certain people who, un-
der certain circumstances, give in to a temptation issued by the government 
are thereby, and on those grounds alone, rightly excused from legal responsi-
bility. This paper describes some of the features of such a theory, a theory 
from which it follows that the entrapment defense is an essential element in a 
just legal system. 
 In the very first case in which a U.S. court considered the entrapment 
defense, Board of Commissioners v. Backus (29 How. Pr. 33, 42 (1864)), a New 
York court rejected it on the grounds that God refused to excuse Eve when 
she opined, “The serpent beguiled me, and I did eat.”1  If the excuse of “be-
guilement” wasn’t good enough for God, why should it be good enough for 
the court?2  In offering this justification for its action, the court chose to in-
terpret the defense as claiming, generally, that “beguiled” defendants are not 
guilty, a claim it took to be false. In fact, however, defendants who offer the 
defense are claiming not just to have been beguiled, but also to have been 
beguiled by the government. The court assumed that this aspect of the defense 
was irrelevant. They assumed, that is, that government beguilement is no 
I 
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more an excuse than serpent. Call this “the problem of private entrapment”: 
A justification of the entrapment defense must explain why it is that, had a 
defendant who successfully employs the entrapment defense been tempted 
by a private party, instead of the government, he would not have been ex-
cused from legal responsibility.3 In this first entrapment case, then, the court 
assumed that there could be no solution to the problem of private entrap-
ment, and so rejected the defendant’s argument.4 
 With the goal of describing part of the theory of legal responsibility 
underlying the entrapment defense, this paper aims to solve the problem of 
private entrapment.5  Imagine a pair of defendants who act precisely the same 
way in response to a temptation offered by another person whom each be-
lieved to be a private party, not working for the government. Perhaps both 
defendants are approached by someone who claims to be able to provide 
security codes for a facility holding something worth stealing to someone 
willing to steal it, and imagine that both defendants, neither of whom has 
done, or contemplated doing, anything like this before, give in to the tempta-
tion and are arrested on leaving the facility with the stolen goods in hand. It 
will be argued that they differ in responsibility if one of them was tempted by 
a private party while the other, unbeknownst to him, was tempted by an 
agent of the government acting with the aim of prosecuting the defendant 
should he give in to the temptation.6 
 The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 defines various concepts 
useful for thinking about entrapment and situates the problem of private en-
trapment within the conceptual framework described. Section 2 draws out 
the details of the first of two broad strategies for justifying the entrapment 
defense: an approach according to which entrapment undermines a certain 
class of defendants’ (those who are not “predisposed”) culpability for the 
crime. The section argues that those who adopt this approach are committed 
to a retributivist justification of legal punishment, in contrast to other sorts. 
This result opens the door to the possibility that the privately entrapped are, 
and the governmentally entrapped (and unpredisposed) are not, deserving of 
legal punishment, a claim that will be argued for in section 4. Section 3 turns 
to the second broad strategy for justifying the defense: the approach accord-
ing to which the defense is justified because entrapment involves unaccept-
able action on the part of the government, quite independently of the culpa-
bility of the defendant. The Model Penal Code’s test for entrapment is used as 
an example of such an approach. The section argues that any adequate effort 
to pursue this strategy necessarily encounters the problem of private entrap-
ment; the problem is solved from this approach only at the cost of the ade-
quacy of the justification of the defense supplied. Section 4 identifies a neces-
sary condition for desert of legal punishment and argues that the privately 
entrapped satisfy that condition, as do the predisposed, while the govern-
mentally entrapped and unpredisposed do not. Thus, the problem of private 
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entrapment is solved. By the end, then, we will have a clearer picture of what 
one needs to think legal responsibility is, and what sorts of conditions un-
dermine it, if one of the strongest obstacles to the justification of the en-
trapment defense is to be overcome. 
 
1. Sharpening the Problem of Private Entrapment 
 
 In all the cases, and hypothetical cases, that concern us, the defen-
dant gave in to a temptation to commit a crime, a temptation provided by 
another party. This class of cases is not as large as one might think, for there 
is a difference between taking bait, or merely availing oneself of an opportu-
nity, and giving in to temptation. Say, for instance, that the police leave a 
door unlocked and lie in wait to see if anyone tries, opportunistically, to steal 
what is behind it. Someone who takes the bait cannot avail himself of the 
entrapment defense merely on the grounds that he would not have been able 
to take the goods had the government not left the door unlocked. In this 
case, the government does not offer the crime to the defendant under the de-
scription banned by the law. The government never says to him “Why don’t you 
steal that stuff?” for the purpose of causing him to do so. An opportunity 
does not count as a temptation to perform a particular type of action, in the 
sense in which the term “temptation” will be used here, unless it presents the 
action under the description that defines the relevant type of action. If you 
tempt someone to steal something then you must present to him the oppor-
tunity to steal as such. The problem of private entrapment arises, then, for all 
and only those cases in which we are ready to excuse a defendant for giving 
in to a temptation, in the sense meant here, when it is supplied by the gov-
ernment, but not when it is supplied by a private party.7 
 The notion of temptation just defined provides a first step, although 
only a first step, toward distinguishing bogus entrapment defenses from le-
gitimate. A defendant’s entrapment defense is to be rejected if the govern-
ment never represented the act it made available to the defendant under the 
description banned by the law. However, not every defendant who acts in 
response to a genuine, government-supplied temptation should have an en-
trapment defense available. Additional work needs to be done to distinguish 
among defendants who acted in response to a government-supplied tempta-
tion. How you choose to draw the line among these defendants will indicate 
what you take to be the fundamental basis of the entrapment defense; it will 
indicate, that is, what you take to be the crucial feature of a case that makes a 
not-guilty verdict appropriate. Two broad approaches can be taken in draw-
ing this line. 
 To understand the two approaches for distinguishing among defen-
dants who employ the entrapment defense, and the two associated justifica-
tions of it, it helps to have in hand a conception of two parallel aspects of 
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legal responsibility. Both legally responsible and morally responsible actions 
are brought about in the familiar way that qualifies them minimally to be held 
to legal or moral standards, respectively. At the least, this means that the ac-
tions for which the agent is being held responsible were not subject to certain 
pressures, such as coercive pressures, that seem to undermine their capacity 
to reflect the facts about the agent that we take ourselves to be most con-
cerned with in assessing legal or moral responsibility. It is possible, in fact 
likely, that we have different concerns in judging someone legally, as opposed 
to morally responsible, and this difference might manifest itself in a differ-
ence in what does and does not count as action that is appropriately held to 
legal and moral standards, respectively. But still, both legal and moral respon-
sibility assessments are sensitive to the particular way in which the act being 
assessed came to be performed. 
 However, in the moral case, the question of whether or not it is ap-
propriate to punish or in some other way censure someone who has acted 
wrongly does not depend on the behavior of those who are to judge him and 
administer his punishment. That is, a person has genuinely done wrong and 
is genuinely morally responsible for his behavior even if he is surrounded 
solely by such morally unsavory characters that there is nobody pure enough 
to be in position to heap him with moral outrage, and even if his transgres-
sions have come to light only as a result of morally objectionable spying and 
squealing. To say that no one is free enough from sin to cast the first stone at 
the sinner is not to say that he is not a sinner. However, legal responsibility, 
at least in criminal cases, is different from moral in this respect. We do not 
hold a person legally responsible if the government has behaved inappropri-
ately toward him in some part of the process that would, given perfect gov-
ernmental conduct, lead to his punishment. We have laws that tell us when 
arrest, prosecution, conviction and punishment do and do not proceed le-
gally, and in some cases we do not take defendants to be legally responsible 
when these procedures are not followed correctly. That is, for the purposes 
of legal responsibility, and not usually for moral, the conduct of those doing 
the assessing and the punishing matters. Broadly, then, we can say that a per-
son is legally responsible for his conduct only if (1) he is what I will call “le-
gally culpable” for it — he has acted in a way banned by the law through a 
process that qualifies him to be held to the law’s standards with regard to 
that conduct8; and (2) his treatment by the government with respect to the 
action has been legally impeccable; it has lived up to the standards of gov-
ernment conduct that the law requires. Substantive criminal defenses are 
aimed at undermining the prosecution’s claim of the defendant’s legal culpa-
bility; procedural defenses, by contrast, are intended to show that the agent is 
not legally responsible, even if legally culpable, because the government has 
not treated him as it ought. 
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 It is difficult to tell whether the entrapment defense is intended to be 
a substantive or a procedural defense. In acquitting an entrapped defendant, 
is the court saying that the defendant’s agency was undermined in some way 
such that a statement of the form “He performed an act of type C” is true, 
but not true in the way that it would need to be to apply the law against acts 
of that type to his case? Or, rather, is the court saying that some part of the 
governmental process that would lead to his punishment has been tainted in 
some objectionable way? Is a court that grants an entrapment defense finding 
that the defendant did not act badly, by legal standards, or that the govern-
ment did something it ought not to have done, by legal standards? 
 In the law, two distinctively different approaches can be found to the 
question of whether a particular defendant, who performed the acts for 
which he is being tried as a result of a temptation supplied by the govern-
ment, was entrapped and is, therefore, not guilty of the crime of which he is 
accused. There can be found, that is, two different ways of drawing the cru-
cial line between defendants who give in to government-supplied temptation. 
These two approaches conform precisely to the two aspects just described of 
legal responsibility under the criminal law. Some have thought that entrapped 
defendants are simply not legally culpable for what they have done; others 
have thought, by contrast, that entrapped defendants may be culpable, but 
are not legally responsible because the government has acted improperly to-
ward them. The former approach is the dominant approach and it has been 
employed by the majority in each of the six Supreme Court cases concerning 
entrapment.9 By contrast, the minority, in all six cases, advocated the alterna-
tive approach. Courts that take entrapment to eliminate culpability ordinarily 
employ what is sometimes called the “Subjective Test” of entrapment, while 
courts that take entrapment to excuse because of governmental misconduct 
employ what is known as the “Objective Test.”10  More about these tests 
shortly. 
 Whichever test you advocate, you identify a feature that you claim to 
be present in all and only those cases of governmentally tempted defendants 
whose entrapment defenses should be honored — either lack of culpability 
or governmental misconduct. However, that feature cannot also be present 
in parallel cases of private temptation, in which the defense is not to be 
granted, without thereby undermining the justification for allowing the en-
trapment defense when the government is involved. The principle that sorts 
governmentally tempted defendants — some of their entrapment defenses 
are to be allowed, some denied — must still allow for lumping of the pri-
vately tempted, none of whom should be granted an entrapment defense. 
This is another way of putting the problem of private entrapment. The test 
for determining if a governmentally tempted defendant is rightly granted an 
entrapment defense implies a justification for allowing the defense at all 
(“such people aren’t culpable,” or “we don’t want our government to act that 
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way”); this justification will be adequate only if it doesn’t also imply that it 
would be justified to allow the defense to the privately entrapped. 
 Notice that there is great initial plausibility to the following two 
claims. First: The advocate of the Objective Test gets a solution to the problem of private 
entrapment for free. After all, if entrapment defenses that are to be honored all 
involve some kind of government misconduct, then it is no surprise that the 
privately tempted are denied the defense; by definition, they are not the vic-
tims of government misconduct. And, second: The advocate of the Subjective Test 
cannot hope to solve the problem of private entrapment. After all, if unpredisposed 
defendants are really not culpable when they accept temptations, it shouldn’t 
matter who is issuing them, and so it seems that they would not be legally 
responsible if tempted by a private party; this seems especially true given that 
usually governmentally tempted defendants have no idea that it is the gov-
ernment that is tempting them, but believe themselves, instead, to be 
tempted by private parties. However, despite their plausibility I will argue 
that both of these claims are false. The argument for this is spread over the re-
mainder of this paper. 
 
2. The Subjective Test and Retribution 
 
 According to the Subjective Test, the entrapment defense fails if it 
can be shown that the defendant was “predisposed” to commit the crime. 
Thus, according to this approach, the fact that the government provided the 
temptation to commit the crime does not automatically ameliorate the defen-
dant’s culpability, even if the temptation was, by ordinary measures, ex-
tremely powerful, and even if the government acted improperly in supplying 
it; predisposed defendants cannot, even in these cases, avail themselves of 
the entrapment defense (although they may have some other defense avail-
able to them). Most courts have accepted the converse of this claim, as well; 
they have held, that is, that, assuming the defendant performed the act for 
which he is being tried as a result of a temptation provided by the govern-
ment, the entrapment defense succeeds if it can be shown that the defendant 
was not predisposed.  
 One might understand appeals to predisposition as efforts to capture 
an intuitive distinction, the distinction between those who would have com-
mitted a crime like that in question in the ordinary course of things had the 
government not entered the scene, and those who would not have. Thus, we 
can formalize the Subjective Test as follows. Here, S is a defendant who per-
formed an act of type C, a type of action banned by a particular criminal stat-
ute, and who did so as a result of a temptation supplied by the government: 
 
The Subjective Test of Entrapment: S’s entrapment defense succeeds if and 
only if If the government had not performed any of the actions that 
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culminated in S’s acceptance of the temptation it provided, it is not 
the case that S would have performed an act of type C on some other 
relevant occasion. 
 
In most cases, this counterfactual “other occasion” will count as “relevant” if 
it might be encountered in the ordinary course of things even without special 
machinations on the part of the government. So, for instance in United States 
v. Woo Wai (223 F. 412 (1915 U. S. App.)), the defendant was given an op-
portunity by actual INS agents, whom he knew to be INS agents and who led 
him to believe they were corrupt, to smuggle illegal Chinese immigrants into 
the country. He evinced great reluctance to do so on the grounds that he 
would be caught. The agents assured him that he would not be caught and 
convinced him of this by noting that he would have the assistance of INS 
agents interested in concealing the crime. Since it is unlikely that Woo Wai 
would have, in the ordinary course of things, encountered corrupt govern-
ment agents in position to aid in both the smuggling of immigrants and the 
concealing of the crime, and since there was ample evidence that he would 
only have committed a crime of the sort in question if it seemed extremely 
unlikely to him that he would be caught, it was ruled that there was not evi-
dence sufficient to support the claim that he had the predisposition to com-
mit the crime.11 
 However, a possible occasion can be considered relevant even if 
there is good reason to think it very unlikely to occur without help from the 
government, if there is also evidence that the defendant was seeking it. For 
instance, in Russell v. The United States (411 U. S. 423 (1973)), an agent of the 
DEA supplied Russell with a substance that was very difficult to procure and 
that could be used to manufacture methamphetamine. Russell went on to use 
the substance for this purpose and sold the drug to the DEA agent, at which 
point he was arrested. The majority of the court held that the rarity of the 
substance was not relevant to the question of Russell’s predisposition, since 
there was evidence that he was actively seeking to procure it and, in fact, had 
succeeded in procuring it in the past. In effect, the majority ruled that the 
occasion that would have prompted him to perform the crime — receipt of 
the rare substance — was relevant despite the fact that he was unlikely to 
have encountered it in the ordinary course of things. It is not hard to see the 
justification for this practice: A predisposition to attempt a crime is not less 
salient to responsibility than a predisposition to perform one. Perhaps neither 
is salient; but if the latter is salient, then so is the former. In cases like Russell, 
there is good reason to think that the defendant would have found an occa-
sion to attempt the crime, for there is good reason to think that he would 
have found an occasion to make an effort to procure the rare substance, even 
if there isn’t good evidence to suggest that he would have succeeded in that 
effort.12 
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 Further, and relatedly, a possible occasion can be considered irrele-
vant, even if it’s quite likely that the defendant would have encountered it in 
the ordinary course of things, for there might also be evidence that he was 
actively trying to avoid encountering it. In Hampton v. United States (425 U.S. 
484 (1976)), for instance, the defendant, who had a past record of illegally 
procuring and distributing heroin, was attending a drug rehabilitation pro-
gram in an effort to rid himself of his addiction. There he met an undercover 
government informant who, after repeated efforts, succeeded in cajoling him 
to acquire the drug so that the two could use together. The majority of the 
court ruled that Hampton was not predisposed, despite having had a track 
record of just such behavior in the past. Animating the decision was the 
thought that although the defendant might very well have fallen off the 
wagon in the ordinary course of things, the circumstances that would prompt 
him to do so were not “relevant” occasions for assessing his predisposition 
since he was actively seeking to avoid such occasions. The thought here is 
similar to that involved in Russell: Someone who is seeking to avoid the cir-
cumstances that will trigger illegal behavior on his part is best understood to 
lack a predisposition to attempt a crime, and so to lack the predispositions of 
a fully culpable defendant. 
 We can think of the Subjective Test for entrapment, then, as offering 
an account of predisposition. According to the test, a defendant is predis-
posed just in case, when we subtract consideration of the government’s ac-
tions, we find that the agent still would have either performed, or attempted 
to perform, an act of the sort for which he is being tried. It is important to 
see that this is an account of predisposition, not an account of disposition 
generally. In some broad sense of the term “disposition,” every defendant 
who gives in to the temptation to act as required for the crime is disposed to 
act that way: Part of what explains the fact that he did so act in response to 
the temptation provided is that he has a certain character or turn of mind, in 
short, a disposition. But not all such dispositions are predispositions in the 
sense of relevance here, because they are not all of them so sensitive as to 
prompt objectionable action on the defendant’s part on “relevant” occasions, 
subtracting consideration of the government’s behavior. 
 But why should predisposition, so understood, be thought to have 
any relevance whatsoever to culpability? And, further, why should the ab-
sence of predisposition constitute not just a mitigating factor, relevant, for 
instance, to sentencing, but, instead, a complete defense, a ground on the 
basis of which a defendant is excused entirely from responsibility? Advocates 
of the Subjective Test have answers to these questions available, although, as 
I will argue, the answers require acceptance of a retributive justification for 
criminal punishment over a deterrence or rehabilitation-based justification.13 
 Could the Subjective Test be justified through appeal to special deter-
rence — deterrence of the recipient of the punishment from criminal activ-
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ity? As a general rule, one can justify allowing a defense to a particular crimi-
nal defendant on the grounds of special deterrence by pointing out that 
something about that defendant made it the case that the prospect of pun-
ishment could not, in fact, or could not fairly have been expected to deter 
him. So goes the standard special deterrence justification for not punishing 
those who kill in self-defense: Someone who believes he will be killed if he 
does not kill an attacker cannot be expected to be influenced by the prospect 
of punishment; whether or not he is to be punished, he probably will, and in 
any event still has the right to protect his life by killing the attacker. But no-
tice that a parallel line of thought cannot hope to explain why the unpredis-
posed, who nonetheless give in to government temptation, are not to be pun-
ished; there is no reason to believe them to be incapable of resisting, nor is 
there reason to think that they had some special right to accept the tempta-
tion, even in the face of the prospect of punishment. This is especially clear 
given that, normally anyway, unpredisposed defendants believed themselves 
to be tempted by a private party, instead of the government; given that fact, 
what about them could make make them inapt targets of deterrent pressure? 
 How would an advocate of a general deterrence justification for 
criminal punishment — the deterrence of people generally from performance 
of certain acts by attaching punishment to them — explain the relevance of 
predisposition to legal culpability? Here the prospects for an adequate justifi-
cation of the defense seem brighter. The policy of denying the defense to the 
predisposed and granting it to the unpredisposed is a fairly efficient way to 
decrease crime. Deterrent pressures are a societal cost; they should be ex-
erted only if by doing so crime rates can be substantially reduced. In fact, 
there is reason to think that the policy enshrined in the entrapment defense 
under the Subjective Test succeeds in spending little of this currency in ex-
change for a substantial decrease in crime. To see this, start with an analogy: 
Imagine that there have been a rash of burglaries in a particular neighbor-
hood and the police are considering adopting one of two ways of reducing 
the numbers. The first proposal is to have regular patrols through the 
neighborhood; the second proposal is to require anyone entering the 
neighborhood to prove himself to be either a resident or invited by a resi-
dent. Both proposed plans, we can be confident, would reduce the number 
of burglaries in the neighborhood, and let’s assume that they would result in 
the same reductions. The first plan is obviously superior to the second, how-
ever, because the first involves exerting deterrent pressure only on those who 
are already planning to commit burglaries, while the second involves placing 
similar pressure on a large number of people who are not; by being asked to 
prove residency, every resident is reminded that he is being watched. By 
adopting the first policy over the second, we can achieve the same reductions 
in burglaries while exerting less unpleasant deterrent pressure. Similarly, we 
might say, by denying the entrapment defense to the predisposed, and grant-
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ing it the unpredisposed, we will manage to reduce the rates of occurrence of 
certain crimes — particular crimes that are hard to detect in other ways like 
drug sales, prostitution and political corruption — while avoiding unneces-
sary deterrent pressures, pressures that won’t serve to lower crime rates rela-
tive to the ordinary course of things. The predisposed, who would have acted 
criminally in the ordinary course of things, remain under pressure not to act 
criminally in a legal system that accepts the Subjective Test, while the unpre-
disposed, who would not have, do not. According to this line, that is, the 
Subjective Test is a way of ensuring that the government is employing the 
minimum amount of coercive pressure needed to bring about less crime than 
there would have been without government involvement. It assures, that is, 
that the government won’t expend detrrent pressure on those who do not 
need to be deterred.14 
 The trouble with this approach is that it assumes, falsely, that no pun-
ishment need be threatened to deter the unpredisposed; it assumes, that is, 
that the unpredisposed simply won’t act criminally if the government doesn’t 
get involved, while all that follows from the concept of predisposition is that 
the unpredisposed are unlikely to do so. This is how the situation in entrap-
ment differs from our hypothetical involving neighborhood burglaries. In the 
hypothetical, we are assuming that residents and those invited by residents 
simply won’t commit burglaries, and so there is no point in exerting deterrent 
pressure on them. But the analogous assumption about the unpredisposed 
who are nonetheless disposed to accept certain temptations is false. The un-
predisposed who give in to temptation are disposed to commit the crime; 
they differ from the predisposed only in that the circumstances that would 
prompt them to do so are peculiar or highly unlikely to be encountered. 
Thus, the view on offer does imply that given scarce resources the govern-
ment can more effectively prevent crime by targeting the predisposed; they, 
after all, are more likely to commit crimes. But it doesn’t imply that, once the 
government has succeeded in ensnaring an unpredisposed person that it 
ought not to punish him. On the contrary, to fail to do so is to fail to deter 
unpredisposed people who happen, as unlikely as it is, to find themselves, 
like the defendant, tempted to commit the crime. In short, a general deter-
rence approach can explain why the predisposed are denied the entrapment 
defense, but it can’t explain why the defense is granted to the unpredisposed.  
 There’s a rejoinder to be considered here. It might be suggested that 
while there is something lost in granting the entrapment defense to the un-
predisposed, since doing so removes the deterrent pressure from those un-
predisposed people who are still disposed to commit the crime, there is also 
something gained: The government is effectively discouraged from placing 
those who are not only unpredisposed but entirely undisposed under deter-
rent pressure. After all, the government can rarely, if ever, tell if an unpredis-
posed person is undisposed to commit the crime; usually, the way this is dis-
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covered is by issuing the temptation and seeing if it is accepted. But the result 
of this behavior on the part of the government is that many undisposed peo-
ple will suffer pressure from the government that they oughtn’t have to en-
dure; they will be, that is, much like the innocent residents of our imagined 
neighborhood who would be forced to justify their presence in their 
neighborhood to suspicious police, were the policy of screening people be-
fore entering the neighborhood adopted.  
 Notice, however, that this rejoinder shifts the ground in an important 
way. It involves abandoning the idea that the unpredisposed who accept gov-
ernment-issued temptation are not culpable and, instead, admits that they are 
culpable but insists that they should nonetheless not be punished so as to 
save the truly innocent undisposed people from unnecessary government 
prodding. Or, in other words, the rejoinder claims that what is really being 
accomplished by granting the entrapment defense to the unpredisposed is 
that a certain form of objectionable government conduct — the placing of 
pressure on the undisposed — is being discouraged. But this suggests that 
under the approach of the rejoinder under consideration, the entrapment de-
fense is not substantive, but procedural: Those who are granted the defense 
are granted it because the government has behaved improperly toward them, 
and not because they are less than fully culpable for what they have done. 
This approach will be discussed in the next section of the paper. For now 
what’s important is only this: At best, the Subjective Test can be justified 
through appeal to general deterrence only at the cost of its subjectivity, as it 
were; at best it can be justified through appeal to general deterrence only if 
the entrapment defense is, at bottom, about government misconduct and not 
about the defendant’s diminished culpability. For our purposes in this sec-
tion, such an approach gives up the game. The question at hand is what justi-
fication of punishment an advocate of the Subjective Test must accept, on 
the assumption that he takes the distinction between the unpredisposed and 
the predisposed to align with a distinction in culpability. What has emerged, 
and will be discussed in the next section, is that someone who takes the en-
trapment defense to be procedural rather than substantive might still think 
that lack of predisposition is sufficient for granting the defense. 
 So much, then, for deterrence. What are the prospects for justifying 
use of the Subjective Test from within a rehabilitation view of punishment? 
Someone who accepts a rehabilitation view must claim that the unpredis-
posed either can’t be rehabilitated, or, more plausibly, are not in need of re-
habilitation, while the predisposed, by contrast, both can be rehabilitated and 
need to be. At most, however, it seems easier to rehabilitate the disposed, but 
unpredisposed, defendant than the predisposed and therefore there is at 
most a reason to give such defendants lighter sentences, and no reason to 
excuse them entirely. It might be argued, however, that under a rehabilita-
tion-based view there is a threshold for objectionable disposition that is re-
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quired for punishment. In order to view a defendant as in need of rehabilita-
tion, for instance, we might need to think him likely to act objectionably again 
and not simply prone to do so under some unlikely circumstance, such as 
those that prompted the unpredisposed defendant to action. So construed, a 
rehabilitation view can seem to fit snugly with the Subjective Test: The Sub-
jective Test draws the line, we might think, between those who are and those 
who are not prone to recidivism in the ordinary course of things, and thus in 
need of the supposed corrective influence of punishment. However, if pre-
disposition walks in lock-step with a disposition to act similarly in the future, 
and if it is the latter that accounts for the appropriateness of punishment, 
then to excuse a defendant just in case he is predisposed is to prejudge the 
question of whether or not an unpredisposed defendant could benefit from 
the rehabilitative influence of punishment. Why not grant an entrapment de-
fense just in case the defendant can show that he is not disposed to do it 
again and allow that the lack of predisposition provides some non-decisive 
evidence for the absence of such a disposition? Someone who holds a reha-
bilitation view of punishment, that is, cannot also hold that the Subjective 
Test identifies the fundamental fact that separates successful from unsuccess-
ful entrapment defenses, even if he thinks that predisposition is found regu-
larly with the kind of dispositions on the part of the defendant, dispositions 
for future criminal conduct, that he takes to warrant punishment. 
 Earlier it was claimed that only someone who accepts a retributivist 
justification for legal punishment has the resources to justify adequately the 
Subjective Test for entrapment. So far, it has been shown that neither a de-
terrence- nor a rehabilitation-based view can explain the Subjective Test’s 
emphasis on predisposition, as opposed to mere disposition to act wrongly. 
Thus it appears that an advocate of the Subjective Test must accept whatever 
justification for punishment remains, and this probably means accepting 
some form of retributivism. But why should it be thought that a retributivist 
view can do any better? Perhaps the approach embodied in the Subjective 
Test is simply inadequate for justifying the entrapment defense. 
 Retributivist views of punishment are notoriously vague. They say 
that legal punishment is justified just in case its recipient deserves it, but they 
are rarely coupled with anything more than a hand-waving attempt to explain 
what desert, in a legal context, really means. It is, of course, non-obvious 
what moral desert amounts to, but even if this is understood well-enough to 
play a robust role in a theory, it cannot help retributivists who (like myself) 
are drawn to broadly positivist accounts of law: If the content of the law is 
not stipulated or constrained by the content of morality, it is difficult to see 
what notion of “desert” is being invoked in the retributivist justification of 
punishment. In section 4, I’ll offer a necessary condition for desert in the 
sense that’s relevant to the law, but the point immediately at hand can be ap-
preciated without having any such condition on the table: There are no prin-
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cipled pre-theoretical reasons to think that an account of legal desert could 
not be crafted under which defendants in cases of the sort at issue are de-
serving of acquittal on the grounds they offer just in case they were unpre-
disposed. That is, without knowing more about what is involved in legal de-
sert, there is no reason to think that a theory of it could not do the work that 
is needed. This is not a defense so much as a promise, a promise on which 
I’ll make good before the end.15 
 Before ending this section, it is worth saying a word about what 
might seem to be a pressing objection to the Subjective Test. It might seem 
that the advocate of the Subjective Test, especially in cases in which the de-
fendant’s entrapment defense is rejected through employing the test, advo-
cates holding people legally responsible not for conduct they commit, but for 
conduct that they would have committed in the ordinary course of things, in, 
that is, the counterfactual scenario in which the government did not provide 
the temptation to commit the crime. So put, this seems monstrous. It seems 
as bad, for instance, as simply detaining people for crimes they haven’t com-
mitted and then convicting them for those crimes on the grounds that they 
would have committed them if not detained.16  But is the advocate of the 
Subjective Test committed to this? No, for those defendants whose entrap-
ment defenses are denied on the grounds that they were predisposed, by the 
standards of the Subjective Test, are not being convicted for what they might 
have done, but for what they did in fact do. They are being claimed to be just 
as culpable for their actions as somebody who acted the same way without 
ever having been tempted by the government. The Subjective Test, that is, 
should be understood as a test for determining whether the acts the agent 
actually committed in response to government temptation arose in the nor-
mal way, the way required for legal culpability, or not. The question before 
the court in such cases, that is, is whether or not the defendant is legally cul-
pable for the actions he actually performed; the test determines if this is so 
by assessing the truth of a counterfactual. That counterfactual is intended to 
tell us if what the defendant actually did in response to the government’s 
temptation is reflective of the facts about the defendant that would justify 
punishing him. 
 Notice, however, that this answer to the objection reveals that the 
advocate of the Subjective Test is committed to the following result: The de-
liberative process that gave rise to the defendant’s decision to accept the 
government’s temptation must be a continuation of a past deliberative process, 
of which we have evidence, and which indicates that the agent would have 
performed the same actions had he found himself in a relevant circumstance. 
To illustrate, recall the case of Hampton, the drug addict who sold heroin to 
a government informant whom he had met in a drug rehabilitation program. 
One way of interpreting the case is this: The evidence suggesting that Hamp-
ton was predisposed was all evidence that predated his decision to enter a 
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drug rehabilitation program; hence, although it did indicate that at an earlier 
time Hampton would have sold heroin in a relevant circumstance, the fea-
tures of Hampton that made that true are no longer present. To take this line 
is to deny that there is identity between the features of Hampton that sup-
port the claim that he was predisposed and the features of Hampton that 
gave rise to his decision to accept the government’s temptation. But, there 
must be identity if predisposition is to be relevant to culpability not for what 
the defendant might have done, but for what he did in fact do in response to 
government temptation. We thus have discovered something about what 
those who take predisposition to be relevant to culpability are committed to: 
They must hold that evidence of predisposition tells us something about the 
very deliberative process that gave rise to the defendant’s action, and not 
merely something about a distinct past deliberative process. This commit-
ment will play some role in the solution to the problem of private entrap-
ment developed in section 4. 
 The primary result of this section — the claim that advocates of the 
Subjective Test are committed to a retributivist justification of punishment 
— while not supplying a solution to the problem of private entrapment tells 
us what such a solution would have to look like if offered by an advocate of 
the Subjective Test: A solution would have to specify a necessary condition 
for desert of legal punishment, and it would have to show that just those 
whose defenses are granted under the Subjective Test (the governmentally 
tempted unpredisposed) fail to satisfy that condition, while just those whose 
defenses are denied under it (the privately tempted and the governmentally 
tempted predisposed) do satisfy the condition. While I will undertake to pro-
vide just such a solution in section 4, it can appear a daunting task, daunting 
enough that we might hope to find an easier solution to the problem of pri-
vate entrapment in the Objective Test and its associated justification for the 
defense.17 
 
3. The Objective Test and the Re-Appearance of the Problem of Private Entrapment 
 
 Impressed by the problem of private entrapment, we might insist that 
the real justification for excusing the entrapped is not the innocence of the 
unpredisposed, but the objectionable nature of certain forms of treatment by 
the government. Thus, according to any version of the Objective Test, a de-
fendant can successfully employ an entrapment defense just in case he can 
show that the government overstepped its bounds in providing him with a 
temptation to commit a crime. The difficult task for someone who endorses 
some version of the Objective Test is to specify the precise conditions under 
which the government’s action has tainted the process through which the 
defendant is arrested and tried, and will be punished if his defense is denied. 
JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 1, NO. 1 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
“THE GOVERNMENT BEGUILED ME”: THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE AND THE PROBLEM OF PRIVATE ENTRAPMENT 
Gideon Yaffe 
 
  16 
Different forms of the Objective Test will specify these conditions differ-
ently.  
 It helps to have a particular version of the Objective Test to work 
with, a version, that is, that specifies precisely what the government has done 
wrong in cases in which an entrapment defense should be honored.18  Ac-
cording to the Model Penal Code’s version of the Objective Test, a defendant is 
entrapped when the government has employed  
 
methods of persuasion or inducement that create a substantial risk 
that such an offense will be committed by persons other than those 
who are ready to commit it. (Model Penal Code §2.13(1)(b)) 
 
This test specifies the nature of the impropriety of government conduct in 
entrapment cases not by describing that conduct, but, instead, by describing 
its effect: It creates a risk of ensnaring someone who was not predisposed to 
commit the crime in question. The test draws the lines differently from the 
Subjective Test because it, unlike the Subjective Test, excuses those who are 
predisposed but accepted an objectionable government-issued temptation, 
objectionable because it risked ensnaring the unpredisposed.19  The Model 
Penal Code’s test formalizes an idea that we saw, already, in discussion of the 
prospects for a general deterrence justification of the Subjective Test in the 
previous section. The idea behind the Model Penal Code’s test is this: What the 
government does wrong in cases in which the entrapment defense is to be 
honored is to exert deterrent pressure on those who do not need to be de-
terred from committing crime, namely the unpredisposed; thus, according to 
the Model Penal Code’s test, the government oversteps its bounds by using 
more coercive pressure to prevent crime than is actually required for the task. 
To put the point even more simply, the government should only be author-
ized to engage in behavior that causes criminal conduct if, by doing so, com-
parable or worse criminal conduct is also thereby prevented; by engaging in 
behavior that risks ensnaring the unpredisposed, however, the government 
engages in behavior that is likely to cause criminal conduct without prevent-
ing any, since the unpredisposed are not likely to have acted criminally with-
out temptation from the government. The Model Penal Code’s test, then, speci-
fies the objectionable nature of government conduct in cases in which the 
entrapment defense is to be honored by focusing not on what the govern-
ment does, per se, but on who they do it to. 
 The difference between the Model Penal Code’s test and the Subjective 
Test can be illustrated by comparing a pair of cases: Jacobson v. United States 
(503 U. S. 540 (1992)), the most recent Supreme Court case on entrapment, 
and United States v. Gendron (18 F.3d 955 (1994 U.S. App.)). Jacobson was a 
farmer who had mail-ordered a pornographic magazinethat included depic-
tions both of naked children and adults in the early 1980s, before child por-
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nography was made illegal. In the late 1980s, after laws against child pornog-
raphy had been passed, the FBI got Jacobson’s name and address after seiz-
ing the records of the bookstore that sold him the magazine. Over the course 
of the next two-and-a-half years, the FBI sent him volumes of fake catalogs, 
from various fictitious companies, advertising child pornography, as well as 
questionnaires from fake companies intended to assess his interest in child 
pornography. He responded to some of the questionnaires and indicated that 
he was interested in naked pictures of boys in their mid-to-late teens, a cate-
gory defined broadly enough to include materials that he had every legal right 
to order. After receiving one catalog from a fake company that claimed to 
fund its free-speech lobbying efforts with the proceeds from the sales of 
pornographic magazines depicting children, and which declared the govern-
ment’s banning of these materials “hysterical nonsense,” Jacobson ordered a 
magazine. He later claimed that he was interested to see for himself if the 
government’s ban of these materials really was hysterical nonsense; he even 
claimed that he was uncertain if the materials would, in fact, depict minors. 
On delivery, he was arrested for receiving child pornography through the 
mail. The majority in the case endorsed the Subjective Test, and honored Ja-
cobson’s entrapment defense on the grounds that Jacobson was not predis-
posed to commit the crime in question.20  In fact, an advocate of the Model 
Penal Code’s test is likely to have reached the same verdict: What the govern-
ment did to Jacobson risked ensnaring an unpredisposed person. The mere 
fact that the government did, in fact, ensnare an unpredisposed person is not 
sufficient to show that its behavior risked that event — often a harm will be 
caused by behavior that doesn’t risk that harm — but, still, in this case the 
government’s behavior does indeed seem to risk ensnaring unpredisposed 
people and so the advocate of the Model Penal Code’s test will want to honor 
Jacobson’s entrapment defense. 
 Gendron, like Jacobson, had bought child pornography before it was 
illegal and, like Jacobson, was targeted by the FBI, which sent him numerous 
catalogs from fake companies advertising child pornography. In fact, he re-
ceived many of the same fake catalogs as Jacobson, including the catalog 
from the company claiming to fund free-speech lobbying with the proceeds 
from sales. He also used the entrapment defense. There are, however, impor-
tant differences between the two cases, differences that might seem to make 
a difference. Gendron, unlike Jacobson, evinced no reluctance about accept-
ing the government’s offers but, rather, pursued them zealously. Further, 
Gendron, again unlike Jacobson, seems to have had entirely prurient motives 
for buying child pornography: On one of the orders that he places he de-
scribes the materials being advertised as those he has been “dreaming of pos-
sessing,” and wonders if there is a discount available to those willing to buy 
in bulk (Appendix to United States v. Gendron (18 F.3d 955 (1994))). The dif-
ference between Gendron and Jacobson is just this: Gendron is predisposed 
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and Jacobson is not. In fact, in this case the court again endorsed the Subjec-
tive Test and, judging that Gendron, in contrast to Jacobson, was predis-
posed to commit the crime, denied the entrapment defense, convicting Gen-
dron. By contrast, an advocate of the Model Penal Code’s test would have ac-
quitted Gendron. After all, assuming that what the government did to Jacob-
son risked ensnaring the unpredisposed, and given that it did the same things 
to Gendron as to Jacobson, it follows that its conduct was just as bad in the 
two cases. 
 Some will see this result, all by itself, as pointing out a flaw in the 
Model Penal Code’s test. 21 After all, we might say, aren’t the Gendrons of the 
world — people preparing to commit crimes behind closed doors that are no 
less dangerous and damaging for our difficulty in detecting them — precisely 
the sorts of people whom we hope to catch using sting operations and other 
similar policing techniques? This, however, is far too fast, as anyone who 
thinks there should be any procedural defenses will see. Procedural defenses 
are always available to the culpable, and so any procedural defense will imply 
the possibility of excusing from punishment some people who are culpable 
for committing crimes. A coerced confession is no more admissible as evi-
dence for the fact that with its help we are able to put a culpable offender 
behind bars. This is a result with which we must live if we are to impose con-
straints on what our government can do in the course of its efforts to punish 
crime. 
 To see the real problem with the Model Penal Code’s proposed test, 
start with the following general point: If creating a risk of X is a bad thing to 
do, it is because X is a bad thing to actually happen. Driving at excessive 
speeds without hurting anyone is bad because of the risk it imposes of hurt-
ing someone; it wouldn’t be bad if there were nothing bad about the actual 
occurrence of what it risks. So, if there is something bad about risking ensnar-
ing the unpredisposed, it must be because there is something bad about actu-
ally ensnaring the unpredisposed. Conversely, if a defendant’s entrapment 
defense is to be denied when the government’s conduct does not risk ensnar-
ing the unpredisposed, despite the fact that it obviously risks ensnaring the 
merely disposed, it follows that there is nothing bad, or nothing bad enough 
to discourage the government from doing it. Thus, a full justification of the 
Model Penal Code’s test is going to require explaining why ensnaring the un-
predisposed is a bad thing to do, and ensnaring the predisposed is not. It 
might be suggested, along the lines of the general deterrence approach dis-
cussed in the previous section, that when the government ensnares an un-
predisposed defendant it acts inefficiently in its efforts to prevent crime by 
using resources that would have been more efficiently used if directed toward 
the predisposed. And this might be true. But has the government acted so 
inefficiently as to deny conviction of the unpredisposed? After all, the gov-
ernment’s efforts have served to identify a disposed defendant, even if un-
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predisposed. Thus, it has served to prevent certain unlikely crimes. To grant 
the defense in such a case, then, is to undo whatever good was done by the 
government’s efforts simply because those efforts could have been better 
used. Economic-style arguments might be offered for this behavior — some-
times it’s better to waste a dollar so as to prevent inefficient usages of future 
dollars than it is to reap whatever slight benefits it could provide. But conclu-
sions reached through arguments of this sort must be limited by rights to 
equal treatment, rights that are trampled in this case. Any particular predis-
posed defendant has the right to an explanation for why he is convicted 
while the disposed, but unpredisposed defendant charged with the same 
crime is released. To say to this defendant that in his case, and not the other, 
the police used its power efficiently is to offer him the wrong sort of expla-
nation for the difference in treatment. With such an explanation, the appeal 
of the Objective Test is lost. To say to our predisposed defendant that the 
government acted outrageously toward the unpredisposed defendant and not 
toward himself is to give the sort of explanation that would justify a differ-
ence in treatment. But there is no sense of outrage, or outrage of the needed 
sort, to be felt toward a government that merely acted inefficiently in one 
case and not in another. 
 The question, then, is how the advocate of the Model Penal Code’s test 
can explain why it is outrageous for the government to ensnare an unpredis-
posed person while it is not comparably outrageous for them to ensnare a 
predisposed. Notice how attractive it is to say, at this point, that the reason 
it’s bad to ensnare the unpredisposed is that an unpredisposed person is not 
really legally culpable for his behavior and, conversely, the ensnared predis-
posed person is culpable. However, the defender of the Model Penal Code can’t 
offer this explanation without giving up the quick solution to the problem of 
private entrapment because the next question will be why it is that an unpre-
disposed person who is tempted by a private party is not excused also on the 
grounds that his culpability has been diminished. That is, this form of de-
fense of the Model Penal Code simply allows the problem of private entrap-
ment to return in a slightly different place.22, 23 
 Could a different version of the Objective Test from that offered by 
the Model Penal Code succeed? Acts of tempting can differ from one an-
other intrinsically: Some are more insistent than others, for instance. Could 
intrinsic differences of this sort help to elucidate the distinction between ob-
jectionable and acceptable government conduct in a way that would still pro-
vide for a solution to the problem of private entrapment? Imagine that two 
acts of temptation by the government were aimed at qualitatively identical 
defendants, both of whom accepted the temptation, but the acts of tempting 
differed from one another; in the first case, say, the government was very 
insistent and in the second it was not. If we are to allow the first defendant’s 
entrapment defense and deny the second’s on the grounds of this difference 
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between the two acts of temptation, we must offer an explanation for why 
the intrinsic difference between the two acts (the difference in degree of in-
sistence on the part of the government) justifies a difference in treatment of 
the two defendants. If we take the difference between the two government 
acts to be significant it must be because the one (the insistent temptation) is 
causing or risking a certain kind of harm that the other (the less insistent 
temptation) is not. But notice that we can’t specify the nature of this harm 
through appeal to a difference in culpability between the defendants without 
returning to a form of the Objective Test that, like the Model Penal Code’s ver-
sion, reintroduces the problem of private entrapment. But what else could be 
normatively significant about the difference between the two acts of tempt-
ing? We might identify a right that is violated by the one act of temptation, 
and not by the other: The insistent act, for instance, might place the defen-
dant under duress. But, in that case, the problem of private entrapment fails 
to be solved for a different reason: Duress induced by private parties excuses 
for just the same reasons that duress induced by the government does. If the 
differences between the two imagined acts of government temptation are too 
large, they will be present also in parallel cases of private temptation; but if 
they are not large enough, they will not justify a difference in treatment of 
their respective defendants. It seems that intrinsic differences between acts of 
government temptation matter to the degree to which they make a difference 
to the culpability of those who accept them. However, with this answer, irre-
sistible as it is, comes the need for a solution to the problem of private en-
trapment. So far, then, it seems that the Objective Test loses its easy solution 
to the problem of private entrapment once the line between acceptable and 
unacceptable government conduct is specified adequately. 
 There is another way, however, to specify the objectionable nature of 
the government’s conduct, a way that appeals neither to the characteristics of 
the temptation’s target (as on the Model Penal Code’s test) nor to the intrinsic 
features of the act of temptation. According to this approach, the standard 
by which to judge the government’s conduct derives from the principles that 
guide the government’s conviction and punishment of defendants, the rea-
sons, that is, for thinking those activities to be legitimate. The government 
overstepped its bounds in issuing the temptation, on this view, just in case 
the issuance of the temptation involved behavior that is somehow in conflict 
with those principles. This is to think of the entrapment defense as a form of 
estoppel.24  The term “estoppel,” of course, means a variety of different 
things in the law, but in the sense that it is relevant here, a party, or the gov-
ernment, is estopped from doing something that it could only do given its 
prior commitment not to. In fact, there is a defense sometimes called “en-
trapment by estoppel,” which is different from the standard entrapment de-
fense. In cases in which entrapment by estoppel is a legitimate defense, the 
government has falsely convinced the defendant that the conduct for which 
JOURNAL OF ETHICS & SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY | VOL. 1, NO. 1 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
“THE GOVERNMENT BEGUILED ME”: THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE AND THE PROBLEM OF PRIVATE ENTRAPMENT 
Gideon Yaffe 
 
  21 
he is being prosecuted is, in fact, legal. 25  So, the thought goes, to allow the 
conviction would be to allow the government to express, by convicting and 
punishing, its commitment to the illegality of the relevant conduct when 
conviction and punishment are available to the government only because it 
earlier expressed its commitment to the denial of that. In other words, by 
convincing the defendant that the conduct was legal, the government com-
mitted itself to not convicting or punishing the defendant for that conduct; 
and since the defendant only acted as he did because of that commitment, to 
convict and punish would be to authorize governmental behavior while at 
the same time authorizing the commitment not to engage in it. This would be 
to involve the judge who convicts in a kind of contradiction or incoherence 
in which both the commitment not to do something and the doing of it are 
legitimized. Thus, we might say, the paradigm case of governmental miscon-
duct is that involved in entrapment by estoppel, but what makes such con-
duct objectionable is that, were the conviction allowed, the government 
would be involved in a kind of incoherence.  
 Notice that estoppel of the sort involved in the defense of entrap-
ment by estoppel only makes sense when the agent who is estopped from 
acting is the same one who was earlier committed not to so acting. There’s 
no incoherence involved in authorizing A’s commitment not to perform an 
act as well as authorizing B’s performance of it. The incoherence only arises 
when A and B are the same agent. So there is no problem of private entrap-
ment by estoppel. There’s no mystery as to why conviction is allowed when a 
private party deceives the defendant into believing that a particular course of 
conduct is legal. The mistake on the defendant’s part does not ameliorate his 
responsibility all by itself (we can assume26), and there is no reason, in this 
case, to estop the conviction and punishment since the conviction and pun-
ishment are not actions on the part of the very same agent who is committed 
to the legality of the conduct. Thus, if the standard entrapment defense is a 
form of estoppel, then the problem of private entrapment is solved. 
 But is it? The case for saying “yes” might be put like this: The gov-
ernment is granted the power to convict and punish only so as to prevent 
crime. When the entrapment defense is to be granted, the government plays 
a causal role in producing the defendant’s conduct. By causing the conduct 
for which the defendant is being prosecuted, however, the government 
commits itself to the position that this is not the sort of behavior that needs 
to be prevented; but to authorize the conviction and punishment is to say 
that the defendant’s behavior is of that sort. Hence to authorize the convic-
tion is to involve the judge in an incoherence; it is to say, at once, that the 
defendant’s conduct is and is not of the sort that ought to be prevented. So, 
the argument goes, by granting an entrapment defense, the judge is saying 
that the government is estopped from convicting.27  Since there is no similar 
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bar to authorizing the conviction when a private party does the tempting, the 
problem of private entrapment is solved. 
 As compelling as this case seems, however, it fails. To see this, notice 
that under this construal of the entrapment defense, the government is 
thought to commit itself to some sort of approval of the defendant’s conduct 
by virtue of having tempted the defendant to engage in it. Tempting, in stan-
dard entrapment cases, is supposed to be analogous to convincing the defen-
dant that the relevant conduct is legal, as in entrapment-by-estoppel cases. 
But why should we think that tempting someone to do something involves 
any such commitment? Or, to refine the point, say it is granted that tempting 
someone to do something involves an at least tacit form of approval of the 
conduct in question. Does it follow that the kind of approval in question is 
of the sort that the government would be denying or repudiating in convict-
ing and punishing the defendant? No. By convicting and punishing, the gov-
ernment is committed only to this much disapproval of the defendant’s con-
duct: It is illegal and, correlatively, of the sort that the government is author-
ized to punish (perhaps because the conduct is deserving of punishment). 
But if in tempting him the government never led the defendant to believe 
that the conduct it tempted him to perform was legal, or somehow undeserv-
ing of punishment, then it did not ever manifest a form of approval of that 
conduct that was in conflict with its later conviction and punishment of him. 
What follows is that the problem of private entrapment can’t be solved by 
emphasizing a similarity between standard entrapment and entrapment by 
estoppel. The problem is that the defense of entrapment by estoppel derives 
its legitimacy from the fact that the government undermines the principles 
behind its own conviction and punishment by the actions that it uses to in-
duce the defendant to act. But since simple temptations do not similarly un-
dermine the principles behind conviction and punishment, the solution to 
the problem of private entrapment to which the entrapment-by-estoppel de-
fense can appeal is not available to the standard entrapment defense. To put 
the point another way, in entrapment by estoppel, the principles that justify 
conviction and punishment can help us to identify a form of government 
conduct that amounts to misconduct; the government can’t act in a way that 
involves commitment to the legality of the defendant’s conduct and later 
premise its conviction on that conduct’s illegality. But the issuance of tempta-
tions of the sort that we do and should take to amount to entrapment do not 
necessarily conflict in a similar way with the principles guiding the govern-
ment in conviction and punishment. Entrapment by estoppel is to be justi-
fied on “objective” lines, but the relevant form of justification cannot stretch 
to standard entrapment and still hope to quickly solve the problem of private 
entrapment. 
 It seems, then, that there are three broad forms of the Objective 
Test, or three ways of specifying the line between acceptable and unaccept-
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able government temptations. The government can be thought to act 
wrongly by virtue of (1) who it targets or risks ensnaring, (2) the intrinsic fea-
tures of its acts of tempting, or (3) conflict between the principles to which it 
is committed in issuing the temptation and those to which it is committed in 
convicting and punishing. Versions of the Objective Test of the third variety, 
it has been argued, overlook the fact that many temptations that amount to 
entrapment do not involve principled commitments that are in conflict with 
those guiding conviction and punishment. More importantly, this section has 
argued that versions of the Objective Test of either the first or second variety 
re-encounter the problem of private entrapment: They may be viable, but 
only when supplemented with an explanation for how the culpability of those 
whose entrapment defenses are to be honored has been undermined by the 
government’s conduct. Advocates of the Objective Test, then, do not earn, 
thereby, an easy solution to the problem of private entrapment. 
 
4. The Solution to the Problem of Private Entrapment 
 
 At the end of section 2, an abstract description was given of the kind 
of solution to the problem of private entrapment required by an advocate of 
the Subjective Test: A solution must specify a necessary condition for desert 
of punishment and must show that the unpredisposed and privately tempted 
fail to satisfy it while the predisposed and governmentally tempted do not. 
The results of section 3 place us in a position to see that a very similar sort of 
solution to the problem of private entrapment is required by the advocate of 
an adequate version of the Objective Test: A solution must specify a differ-
ence in culpability between the unpredisposed and privately tempted, on the 
one hand, and the governmentally tempted and predisposed, on the other. 
Since, as was argued in section 2, such a difference in culpability can’t be 
found without appeal to a retributivist justification of punishment, drawing 
the needed line requires specifying (at least) a necessary condition for desert 
unsatisfied by the former set of defendants, and satisfied by the latter. First, 
then, whether it is the Subjective or Objective test we advocate, we need a 
necessary condition for desert of legal punishment. 
 Start with the following form of informal justification for the issuing 
of a punishment, “He brought it on himself.”  When we say things of this 
sort to justify inflicting a person with a punishment, what do we mean? We 
don’t take ourselves to be merely pointing out what is already known, namely 
that the defendant did something that deserves punishment. We seem to be 
saying more than we would were we to say instead nothing more than, “He 
deserves it.”  But what more is being said? We don’t mean what we literally 
say, for we still think it is necessary for us, or the prison guards, to actually 
issue the punishment; we don’t think, for instance, that left to his own de-
vices the defendant who is to be punished will deprive himself of liberty, or 
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voluntarily pay a fine, even if given no incentive by the state to do so. Crimi-
nals almost never actually choose to be punished; they choose illegal acts ei-
ther disregarding the punishment, or perhaps not thinking about it at all, or 
believing themselves to be capable of avoiding it. In what sense do the de-
servingly punished, then, “bring the punishment on themselves”? 
 To give some systematic content to this thought, it helps to have in 
hand a particular conceptual tool: the idea of pressures on deliberation, par-
ticularly pressures regarding what features of possible actions (including, al-
though not limited to, their consequences) we grant reason-giving force in 
deliberation. Deliberation issues in decision and the formation of intention 
following reflection on various possible actions, and the weighing of reasons 
for and against the actions considered. But, in deliberating, an agent faces a 
wide variety of normative constraints: He is under pressure with regard to the 
process through which a decision arises; if the decision arises in the wrong 
way, then his deliberation has fallen short of what it ought to be. Some of 
these constraints have their source in prudential rationality: An agent is under 
peculiarly rational pressures with regard to deliberation — pressures, for in-
stance, to consider actions that he believes to be means to actions he intends. 
Among the wide range of rational constraints on deliberation are constraints 
regarding what features of considered actions are and are not to be granted 
reason-giving force. Rationality prescribes that some possible causal conse-
quences, for instance, need to be considered and weighed. But which ones? 
Just the likely consequences? How likely is likely enough? Just the conse-
quences that are to befall the deliberator? Or must he also consider conse-
quences of his action for others? If so, which others? Just those whom he 
cares about? Just those who can help him to get what he wants? In debating 
the answers to these questions we debate about what prudential rationality 
requires of deliberation. 
 Some pressures on deliberation, even with regard to what features of 
an action to consider, are peculiarly moral: Morality might require, for in-
stance, that one grant reason-giving weight to other people’s pain, even those 
whom one hates, and might require that one give greater weight to such pain 
than the pain of animals, for instance. It seems plausible that among the con-
sequences of possible actions that morality requires us to reflect upon are 
those consequences that would come about were the action to be rewarded 
with everything that it deserves morally. Agents labor under pressure to grant 
reason-giving force to what would happen were they to perform a particular 
act in a world in which all transgressions are met with their just desserts; and 
they are under such pressure regardless of their assessments of the likelihood 
that this will happen. If conduct you are considering would warrant your be-
coming a pariah, then you are under pressure to weigh that consequence in 
your deliberations even if you are all but certain that you won’t become a pa-
riah even if you act that way. In addition, and of particular importance, is the 
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fact that agents labor under pressure to grant reason-giving weight to the 
mere fact that an act is moral or immoral, independently of the consequences 
that are attached, in a perfectly just world, to moral or immoral action. If an 
act is immoral, agents labor under pressure to grant that fact itself reason-
giving weight in their deliberations, independently of the consequences for 
themselves or others of performing such an act. 
 Agents labor under very similar pressure with regard to deliberation 
in so far as they are citizens of a state: For each action they consider, they are 
under pressure to seriously consider what will happen if the government re-
sponds to that action in all the ways the law requires and allows the govern-
ment to respond, and they are under pressure to take seriously the legal status 
of each considered act — its legality or illegality. Agents labor under pres-
sure, that is, to grant reason-giving weight to the legal consequences of action, con-
sequences that may or may not actually come to pass, but that would come to 
pass were the law to function perfectly; and, more importantly for our pur-
poses, they labor under pressure to grant reason-giving weight to the conse-
quence-independent legal status of the acts they consider. 
 In addition, that an agent is under pressure to grant a particular legal 
consequence or the legal status of an act some reason-giving force in his de-
liberations does not imply that he knows he is under such pressure. Say, for 
instance, that it is illegal for me to spit on the sidewalk, but I don’t know that 
it is. One of the legal consequences of spitting on the sidewalk, say, is a pub-
lic caning. I am, therefore, under pressure to grant the caning reason-giving 
force in my deliberations about whether or not to spit on the sidewalk and I 
am under similar pressure to grant the illegality of spitting on the sidewalk 
reason-giving force. My deliberations have failed to live up to the standards 
imposed by the law when I fail to grant these features any reason-giving 
force, despite the fact that I have no idea that the act is illegal or that such a 
punishment is mandated by the law. Notice that we might be tempted to say 
that I am under legal pressure to grant these features reason-giving force be-
cause I am under legal pressure to inform myself about what the law requires 
of me. But, in fact, this oversimplifies the situation. The law doesn’t require 
that we know what it requires; it only requires that we conform. The obliga-
tion to conform requires us to overcome various obstacles to conformity, 
including ignorance about what the law requires, but overcoming ignorance 
is required of us only in so far as failure to do so would result in non-
conformity. What this shows is that the concept of legal pressures on delib-
eration is not a psychological concept, but a normative one. A person who is 
under such pressure may or may not feel it, and may or may not understand 
it. It is possible that in order to be under certain pressures in deliberation, 
you need to have had fair opportunity to conform — perhaps this is the root 
justification for the requirement of publicity of the law in a just legal system 
— but, nonetheless, we cannot hope to determine whether or not an agent 
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was under pressures in his deliberations merely from examination of his psy-
chological and cognitive states. 
 What is the difference between saying “S was under pressure to grant 
such-and-such legal features of C weight in his deliberations” and saying, 
merely, “C-ing is illegal and will be given such-and-such a punishment”? Af-
ter all, we might say, if the first statement is true, the second is, and vice 
versa; doesn’t that show that there is really no difference between them? The 
difference between the two statements can be seen by noting that a law 
specifying punishment for an act imposes two norms, not just one: It im-
poses the obvious norm on conduct; it says you are doing the wrong thing, 
from a legal point of view, if you act as described in the law. But it also im-
poses a distinct norm on deliberation; it implies that you are deliberating in a 
less than fully adequate way if you fail to grant the legal features of the act 
reason-giving weight in deliberation. Of course, it is only violation of the first 
of these norms, and not the second by itself, that ever warrants punishment; 
but still, it is a fact, and an easily overlooked one, that the second norm is 
imposed also when an act is made criminal. 
 With the notion of pressures on deliberation in hand, return to the 
question of what we mean when we say of a person who is being punished as 
the law specifies, “He brought it on himself.”  What we mean stems from the 
observation that an agent who engaged in fully informed and procedurally 
perfect deliberation, and who was considering the act he performed, would 
have granted reason-giving force to the illegality of the act. Thus, someone 
who performed an illegal act without giving its legal status any thought, or 
without granting that status any weight in his decision about what to do, 
didn’t deliberate consonant with the full range of pressures on deliberation; 
and somebody who did take the act’s illegality into consideration, and chose 
the act anyway, chose the act while allowing the illegality to figure into his 
deliberations as a reason not to perform the act, but a reason that was out-
weighed by other goods the act promised. He, thus, chose the illegality of the 
act itself in the following weak sense of the term “choose”: The reason-giving 
force of the act’s illegality was included in the calculus of reasons that entered into his delib-
eration and he nonetheless chose an action that was illegal. Since the punishment is 
appropriate just in case the act was illegal, when an agent chooses (in this 
weak sense) an illegal act, he also chooses (in the same weak sense) the man-
dated punishment. It would be, therefore, too strong to say that the defen-
dant incurs the punishment voluntarily; the sense in which the punishment is 
chosen is too weak for that. But, still, incurring the punishment has a feature 
in common with consequences brought about voluntarily: It is the upshot of 
a feature of the act the reason-giving force of which is weighed, or ought to 
have been. This second disjunct is particularly important: A person can have 
brought a punishment on himself even if he never gave the illegality of the 
act any thought and even if he had no idea that the act was illegal, for the 
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absence of these psychological states does not necessarily undermine the fact 
that he is under pressure in deliberation to grant the act’s illegality reason-
giving weight. 
 This much explains why it is that a person does not deserve punish-
ment, as specified by a statute, for an act performed before the statute ban-
ning it was made law. Such a person could not be said to bring the punish-
ment on himself, for at the time of action the agent did not labor under any 
pressure to grant the illegality of the act reason-giving weight; he could not 
have since the act was not, at the time, illegal. But if he was under no such 
pressure, then he can’t be said to have, even in the weak sense, chosen the 
punishment, and so does not deserve it. The sense in which the legal pres-
sures on deliberation are distinct from psychological pressures emerges here, 
also, although in a different way. Imagine that a person performs an act be-
lieving it to be illegal despite the fact that there is no statute banning it. Now 
imagine that, later, a statute banning it is made law and the statute is retro-
spective: It says that acts of the relevant sort were illegal before the statute 
was made law.28  Notice that if the pressures on deliberation were psycho-
logical, then there would be no reason to think it unjust to punish the person 
in our example: After all, he believed himself to be choosing an illegal act and 
so believed himself to be under legal pressures in deliberation that he elected 
to ignore. However, it would be unjust to punish him and for just the reasons 
being described here: He was not, in fact, under pressure to grant the illegal-
ity of the act reason-giving weight, even though he thought he was, and so 
cannot be said to have chosen the punishment in the weak sense and in the 
face of such pressures. 
 However, more can be said about what is required to have brought a 
punishment on oneself. To see this, note first what I will call “the canceling 
effect,” a phenomenon most easily illustrated from consideration of the pru-
dential pressures on deliberation, pressures to grant various causal conse-
quences of action reason-giving weight. Imagine that all of the acts one is 
considering (and this list includes omissions of acts) will result in the occur-
rence of a particular result; that result, from a practical point of view, is inevi-
table. Are you under prudential pressure to grant the result reason-giving 
weight in your deliberations about what to do? No, for the granting it weight 
in your deliberations cannot have any effect on the outcome of those delib-
erations. It adds equally, in the calculus of reasons, to each of the acts you are 
considering and so cannot make it the case that any one of them is favored 
more strongly by reasons than the others. This is the canceling effect: The 
inevitability of a feature of action — its being a feature of all the different 
actions an agent is considering — cancels the need to grant it any reason-
giving weight in deliberation. This doesn’t mean that the agent won’t grant it 
any weight — he might still; it means only that he hasn’t failed to live up to 
the standards of perfect deliberation if he does not. Another way to put the 
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point: When a feature of action, such as a consequence of action, is subject 
to the canceling effect — each of the various possible actions the agent is 
considering possess it — the agent’s failure to grant it any reason-giving 
weight in deliberation is not a failure on his part to exercise correctly the pe-
culiar, and peculiarly human, capacities that are required to engage in delib-
eration. 
 Normally, an agent cannot be said to have brought a punishment on 
himself if the illegality of the act for which he is punished was subject to the 
canceling effect. Imagine, for instance, a state in which the law says simply 
that anyone who knowingly causes, or knowingly allows, the death of a per-
son will be punished, and specifically includes both cases of killing in self-
defense and suicides among those killings that it bans. A person who finds 
himself having either to kill another who threatens him or to allow himself to 
die at that person’s hand, then, is facing a situation in which all of his alterna-
tive actions are illegal; he must either knowingly kill another, or knowingly 
allow his own death, and both acts are banned by the law. Such a person 
can’t be said to have brought the state’s punishment on himself, even if he 
did, in fact, grant reason-giving weight to the illegality of each possible act in 
his decision about what to do: Everything that he was considering doing was 
illegal. Thus, whether he granted the illegality any weight in his deliberations, 
or none at all, could not have had an impact on the deliberation’s results. 
Since the illegality of his various alternative actions was subject to the cancel-
ing effect, in this case, he was not under normative pressure to grant it rea-
son-giving weight, and so can’t be said to have brought the punishment on 
himself when he is punished. Such a state, then, has a flawed criminal law: It 
requires punishment of the undeserving. 
 Notice, however, that this conclusion would be undermined were we 
to elaborate the story a bit: Imagine, for instance, that the man planned to kill 
this other person and took steps to do so. In the process, the other person 
attacked him and made it clear that he would kill him if not killed trying. 
Now, although the man in our example still faces a situation in which every 
action he is in position to consider is illegal, he can still be said to have 
brought the punishment for killing on himself. The additional piece of in-
formation — that the man was plotting the death of his assailant — under-
mines the excusing force deriving from the inevitability of performing an il-
legal act. Here, it seems, the man was under pressure to grant the illegality of 
the act reason-giving weight prior to the situation developing into one in 
which the illegality became subject to the canceling effect. Hence, since there 
was a time at which the illegality was or ought to have been granted meaning-
ful reason-giving weight, the punishment was, in fact, chosen in the weak 
sense; the man can still be said, in this instance, to have brought the punish-
ment on himself. 
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 We thus have the following necessary condition for a punishment to 
be deserved: 
 
S deserves to be punished for C only if At some prior time, S was un-
der legal pressure to grant the illegality of C reason-giving weight in 
his deliberations and decided to do C, despite those pressures. 
 
As we’ve seen, an agent might not deserve to be punished because in all of 
those deliberations in which he considered C-ing, the illegality of C was sub-
ject to the canceling effect. And, an agent can deserve to be punished, even if 
the illegality of C was subject to the canceling effect in some of his delibera-
tions about C so long as in other deliberations C’s illegality was not subject to 
the canceling effect and he chose C. In order for punishment to be deserved, 
we need to find some past deliberation in which the agent was genuinely un-
der legal pressure to consider the act’s illegality, to grant it reason-giving 
weight in his deliberations, and chose an act of the relevant sort in the face of 
such pressures. 
 A number of further complexities require note: First, notice that 
there is no canceling effect when the features of alternative actions are of 
different sorts; legal consequences do not cancel the pressures of prudential 
consequences, nor do moral cancel legal, for instance. Imagine that your boss 
threatens to dock your pay by $1,000 if you refuse to be involved in a form 
of accounting fraud the penalty for which is a fine of $1,000. Thus, assuming 
that your boss will certainly manage to dock your pay if you don’t comply 
and that you will certainly be convicted of fraud if you do, compliance has a 
$1,000 loss as a legal consequence, while refusal has a $1,000 loss as a causal 
consequence. It would be silly to say that you are under no pressure to grant 
the punishment reason-giving weight in your deliberations about what to do, 
or that you haven’t brought the punishment on yourself when you play ball 
with the boss.29  But nor is the view on offer here committed to these silly 
results, for there is no reason to expect causal consequences to cancel legal, 
or vice versa. Similarly, there is no reason to expect the illegality of one pos-
sible action to cancel the immorality of another, or vice versa. Deep ques-
tions linger here: How are we required to deliberate when there are reasons 
of different sorts favoring competing actions? But hard questions of this sort 
are best understood as questions about the conditions under which reasons 
of different sorts trump one another and not as questions about the condi-
tions under which reasons of different sorts cancel one another; canceling is a 
phenomenon confined to single kinds of reasons.30 
 Another complexity: The canceling effect is a matter of degree, and 
in two different ways. First, there can be some degree of canceling when dif-
ferent considered alternative actions have consequences of different values. 
Say, for instance, that you are trying to decide whether or not to do act A or 
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act B. A will result in a net loss of $100 while B will result in no net loss of 
funds. If you choose A, thus deciding that it is worth the $100 cost, then you 
choose that loss in the weak sense of choice: You are under pressure to grant 
the loss reason-giving force in your deliberations and yet you elect a course 
of conduct that has it as a consequence. But now imagine that, instead of re-
sulting in no net loss, B also would result in a $100 loss. Now the $100 loss is 
subject to the canceling effect: You can just ignore it in your deliberations 
and you won’t be deliberating in opposition to the pressures of prudential 
rationality; maybe you give it weight, but you are under no pressure to do so. 
But it would be somewhat subject to the canceling effect, although not com-
pletely subject, were the loss for performing B $40 instead of $100. Then the 
$100 loss associated with A need only be granted the reason-giving force of a 
$60 loss. It is somewhat, although not entirely, canceled by the presence of a 
comparable evil’s attachment to the other acts being considered. This last is 
an example of the first way in which the canceling effect can be a matter of 
degree.31  Similarly, canceling can be a matter of degree even when the fea-
tures of the alternative actions are consequence-independent. If you are 
choosing between committing a burglary and committing a murder, the ille-
gality of the burglary does not entirely cancel the illegality of the murder. As-
suming that murder is strictly worse, legally speaking, than burglary, you re-
main under pressure to grant the illegality of the murder reason-giving 
weight, but do not labor under pressure to grant the illegality of the burglary 
any weight. 
 Before moving to the second way in which canceling is a matter of 
degree, notice that when we complicate our picture by considering features 
of action the values of which are not easily, or only clumsily, expressed in 
monetary terms, the question of how much canceling there is is the question, 
which won’t be answered here, of what is required of us in the face of inc-
ommensurable, or only partially commensurable values. It would be not just 
silly, but deeply distorting, to suggest that a person deciding whether or not 
to accept $100 in exchange for dancing on the table might be under no pres-
sure to consider the loss of dignity associated with accepting; it would be ob-
viously and deeply mistaken, that is, to suggest that under certain circum-
stances (those in which the disutility of the indignity is just the same as that 
associated with, say, a $90 loss), there is no prudential pressure to grant the 
indignity reason-giving force. The disvalue of indignity is not the sort of 
thing that can necessarily be monetized. Still, it would be easy to overstate 
the point. The choice between a monetary loss and a loss of one’s dignity 
(the choice put by the offer to dance on the table) is harder than the choice 
between a lesser monetary loss and the loss of one’s dignity (imagine that the 
offer was for only $50). But why? The difference in difficulty derives from 
the fact that a monetary loss does indeed cancel the disvalue of the indignity 
to some degree, and thus a lesser monetary loss cancels it more, even if it is 
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difficult, or most likely impossible, to quantify the degree of canceling in-
volved. A loss of an apple has an ameliorating effect on the gain of an or-
ange, even if they are, in the end, apples and oranges. In short, the first sense 
in which the canceling effect is a matter of degree is intended to capture, 
also, degrees of canceling involved in the comparison of features of action 
the values of which are incommensurable, or only partially commensurable. 
 However, there is another way in which the canceling effect is a mat-
ter of degree that will turn out to be more important for our purposes: A par-
ticular feature of action can be more or less inevitable. So, for instance, imag-
ine three agents, S1, S2 and S3, each of whom is choosing among acts A, B 
and C. S1, let’s imagine, will suffer a $100 loss regardless of which of the 
three he chooses. For him, the $100 loss is entirely subject to the canceling 
effect; in deciding what to do, S1 is not under pressure to grant the $100 loss 
any reason-giving force. S2, by contrast, will suffer the $100 loss only if he 
performs act A or B, but not if he performs act C; S3 will suffer the loss only 
if he performs A, but not if he performs B or C. Since part of what is in-
volved in deliberating among three different actions is pair-wise comparison 
— all our agents must decide if they prefer A to B, A to C and B to C — the 
$100 loss is somewhat subject to the canceling effect in S2’s deliberations, 
and not at all in S3’s. When S2 is determining whether to rank A above B or 
vice versa he is under no pressure to grant the $100 loss reason-giving 
weight; since it attaches to both actions, it is not relevant to the question of 
which of the two to prefer. He is, however, under pressure to grant the loss 
weight in comparing A to C and in comparing B to C. Thus, for him, the loss 
is somewhat subject to the canceling effect. It is subject to it to a greater de-
gree than it is for S3 and to a lesser degree than S1. 
 Given that the canceling effect is a matter of degree in these two dif-
ferent ways, what we should really say is that a punishment is deserved only if 
the agent is under pressure to grant the illegality of the act some sufficiently high 
degree of reason-giving force in some prior deliberations. If the act’s illegality 
is strongly enough subject to the canceling effect that the punishment can no 
longer be said to be brought on the agent by himself, then the agent is not 
deserving of punishment. I am not in a position to say what degree of cancel-
ing, in either sense, is enough to undo desert. I’m not sure, in fact, that any-
thing satisfactory can be said on that score. However, for our purposes the 
important point will only be that there is some degree of reason-giving force 
that the agent is under pressure to assign the act’s illegality in some prior de-
liberation, if the punishment for that act is to be deserved.  
 To solve the problem of private entrapment it is sufficient to show 
the following: (1) The illegality of the act of an unpredisposed agent who is 
tempted by the government is sufficiently subject to the canceling effect to 
undermine desert of punishment for that act; (2) The illegality of the act of 
an unpredisposed agent who is tempted, not by the government, but by a 
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private party, is not sufficiently subject to the canceling effect to undermine 
desert of punishment; and (3) A predisposed defendant was subject to suffi-
ciently strong pressure to grant reason-giving force in his deliberations to the 
act’s illegality to satisfy the necessary condition for desert specified above, 
regardless of whether he is tempted by the government or a private party. (1) 
provides an explanation for why unpredisposed defendants tempted by the 
government are not deserving of punishment. (2) provides an explanation for 
why the same excuse does not reach to those tempted by private parties. And 
(3) explains why predisposition defeats the entrapment defense. 
 Since (3) is the easiest of these three claims to establish, I begin with 
it. If a defendant is predisposed in the sense outlined in the Subjective Test, 
then in order to determine if he is deserving of punishment we need to look 
at more than just the deliberations that led to his decision to give in to the 
government’s temptation. After all, if there is evidence of predisposition, 
then there is evidence of prior deliberation about whether or not to perform 
an act of the sort that he later did perform in response to the government’s 
temptation. And, importantly, those prior deliberations are not disconnected 
from the final deliberations on which he acted; rather, the deliberations 
launched in response to the government-supplied temptation are a continua-
tion of deliberations begun earlier. (This is one of the results reached in sec-
tion 2.)  But there is reason to think that he was subject to pressure to grant 
the act’s illegality reason-giving force in those earlier deliberations. Given that 
those earlier deliberations are part and parcel of the same deliberative process 
on which he acted, it is right to say that he satisfies the necessary condition 
for desert specified above. If we punish him, we might very well be in a posi-
tion afterward to say, in justification for our act, “He brought it on himself.”  
Thus, the relevance of predisposition is simply that a predisposed defendant 
was considering acts of the sort he committed, was under pressure to grant 
the illegality of those acts reason-giving force in his deliberations, and, as part 
of the same deliberative process, chose those acts despite such pressures. 
This still leaves open the possibility, to be closed shortly, that an unpredis-
posed defendant, tempted by the government, is just as deserving of pun-
ishment. 
 Before moving on to claims (1) and (2), let’s return, briefly, to the 
case of Gendron. Gendron, recall, like Jacobson, bought child pornography 
through the mail and was subject to essentially all of the same treatment from 
the government as Jacobson. However, as he was seeking child pornography 
from the first and appeared to have an entirely prurient interest in obtaining 
it, there is sufficient reason to think he was predisposed. We’re now in posi-
tion to see why his entrapment defense is to be denied. It is to be denied not 
because of the prurience of his motives for purchasing child pornography — 
and this a good thing, for had Jacobson been buying porn from a real com-
pany that really did fund free-speech lobbying with the proceeds, he would 
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have been entirely guilty of a crime despite the relatively benign nature of 
such motives. No, Gendron is to be punished because there is good evidence 
to suggest that he brought the punishment on himself. There is good evi-
dence, that is, that well before the government entered the scene, Gendron 
had been considering the purchase of child porn and had been under legal 
pressure to grant the illegality of that action reason-giving weight in his delib-
erations. Prurient interests in child porn do not spring up overnight and, 
even if they did, they would not inspire a man to seek ways to buy in bulk. It 
also seems clear from the way in which Gendron responded to the govern-
ment’s efforts to tempt him, that the deliberation in which he engaged was a 
continuation of those prior deliberations, and he elected to buy banned por-
nography despite the pressure to grant the act’s illegality reason-giving 
weight. We have identified the relevance, then, of Gendron’s predisposition: 
It tells us that he deliberated in the way necessary to be justly subject to pun-
ishment. 
 Now, consider claim (1) — the claim that the illegality of the act of 
an unpredisposed agent tempted by the government is sufficiently subject to 
the canceling effect to undermine desert. If a defendant is not predisposed, 
then for our purposes the only deliberation relevant to the question of 
whether or not he was deserving of punishment is the deliberation that is-
sued in the decision to give in to the temptation supplied by the government. 
The reason is this: If we accept that he was not predisposed, then we think 
that one of two things is true. Either we think that he would not, in the ordi-
nary course of things, ever have considered performing acts of the sort which 
he performed in response to temptation, or we think that, if he did consider 
such acts, and found himself under pressure to grant the illegality of those 
acts reason-giving force in his deliberations, he would not have chosen the 
punishment, in the weak sense: He would have given the illegality of the act 
reason-giving force in his deliberations but he would have elected an action 
that was not illegal. The former sort of unpredisposed defendant never 
would have faced the pressures to grant the act’s illegality reason-giving force 
in his deliberations, and so would never have responded to those pressures in 
the way required to be deserving of punishment. The latter sort of unpredis-
posed defendant would have faced such pressures, but would have re-
sponded as we think a citizen ought, and so would not have acted so as to 
warrant punishment. Hence the question is only whether, in deciding to give in to 
the government’s temptation, he brought the punishment on himself. Was he sub-
ject to pressure to grant the illegality of the act reason-giving force in those 
deliberations? No deliberations prior to those are of relevance to the ques-
tion that the court must answer. 
 Now notice that the government is not supplying the defendant with 
the temptation idly; rather, it is doing so for the purpose of causing him to perform 
an illegal act should he give in to the temptation. What this means, and it is 
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nicely illustrated in the most important entrapment cases, is that the govern-
ment tracks performance by the defendant of an illegal act. By “track” here I 
mean that the government tracks this result in the same sense in which a 
heat-seeking missile tracks a heat source: Should the heat source move, the 
missile will move also, and, similarly, should the agent resist accepting a 
temptation to perform an illegal act the government will adjust the form of 
the temptation so as to increase the chances that he will. The government in 
such cases is striving to find the right temptation, the one that will induce the 
defendant to give in. If it finds that one approach does not work, that the 
defendant resists, then it will try another avenue. In United States v. Woo Wai 
(233 F. 412 (1915 U.S. App.)), for instance, the case in which INS agents 
convinced the defendant to smuggle illegal immigrants, the government 
made repeated efforts to induce Woo Wai to comply and gave him more and 
more plausible assurances that he would not be caught. Similarly, in Jacobson, 
the government tried a wide variety of different tactics to induce Jacobson to 
order child pornography through the mail, including, in the end, offering him 
the pornography as a way of supporting free-speech lobbying efforts. The 
point is that the government in such cases is ready to tailor the temptation to 
the defendant in order to find the form of temptation to which the defendant 
is willing to submit. In these cases, then, a third party, aware of the force that 
the government was applying to the defendant, might be able to see, for in-
stance, that when Woo Wai is choosing on an early occasion whether or not 
to accept the temptation, down the road of acceptance lies immediate viola-
tion of the law, while down the road of rejection lies a more attractive offer 
and violation of the law in giving in to it. If the government were all-
powerful and completely determined to cause the defendant to give in to a 
temptation to perform an illegal act, and if the defendant’s entrapment de-
fense was to be rejected, then every act that the defendant was in position to 
consider would be illegal. Thus, under these, admittedly stringent conditions, 
the act’s illegality is completely subject to the canceling effect. Given that it is 
the defendant’s illegal conduct at which the government aims, and given the 
imagined unlimited capacity to provide temptation, eventually the govern-
ment will get what it wants if the defendant’s entrapment defense is not hon-
ored. Given more reasonable assumptions — the government has limited 
resources and only so much interest in the defendant — the fact that the 
government tracks the defendant’s performance of an illegal act makes the 
act’s illegality more subject to the canceling effect in the defendant’s delibera-
tions (in the second sense in which subjection to the canceling effect is a 
matter of degree — it is more inevitable) than it would have been in the ab-
sence of that tracking.32 
 The point just made — that the government tracks the performance 
of an illegal act by the defendant — lies at the center of the solution to the 
problem of private entrapment, and so it is worth explaining in a bit more 
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detail.33  To understand the point, consider Figure 1, which represents, in two 
different ways, the decision that the defendant, unbeknownst to him, faces. 
Consider, first, the extended form representation of that decision. At first, 
the defendant must decide whether or not to accept T1, the first temptation 
issued to him by the government. If he accepts it, he performs an illegal act. 
But if he rejects it, under the assumption that the government is tracking his 
performance of an illegal act, he will face a new temptation to perform an 
illegal act; if he accepts that temptation, he performs an illegal act; if he re-
jects it then, again, he faces a new temptation, and so on. Assuming the gov-
ernment is truly all-powerful and truly determined to bring it about that the 
defendant acts illegally, the defendant can never hope to gain the goods 
promised by the act in question, the goods that make the act tempting to 
him, through the avenue he believes available to him, without thereby per-
forming an illegal act. This is why there are no branches that involve both the 
acceptance of a temptation and his performance of a legal act.  
 Notice, however, that it is not entirely clear from the extended form 
representation of his situation why the illegality of the act in question is sub-
ject to the canceling effect in his deliberations. After all, when deciding 
whether or not to accept T1, the agent is choosing between performing an 
illegal act and refraining from such a performance; he does not seem to be 
faced with a choice between illegal acts. However, the normal form represen-
tation of the defendant’s situation makes it clear that this description of the 
choice he faces is misleading. In the normal form representation, the defen-
dant is represented as choosing among temporally extended courses of con-
duct, or paths from the starting point to a terminal node. He is represented 
as choosing among (1) accepting T1, (2) rejecting T1 and accepting T2, (3) 
rejecting T1 and T2, but accepting T3, etc. However, again under the as-
sumption that the government is tracking his performance of an illegal act, 
every course of conduct that involves his receipt of the goods promised by 
performance culminates with his performance of an illegal act. So, if we con-
strue the agent as choosing, from the first, between extended courses of con-
duct, it is clear why the illegality of the act is subject to the canceling effect: 
Every temporally extended course of conduct that he is in position to con-
sider culminates in his performance of an illegal act.  
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Figure 1: T1, T2, etc. represent various temptations the government is pre-
pared to issue to the defendant. Black circles represent the performance by 
the defendant of an illegal act.  
 
 This raises a question: Why, in thinking about the pressures on deliberation 
faced by the agent, should we consider the normal form representation of his decision 
rather than the extended form representation? A first point to make is that, even under the 
extended form representation, it can appear that the illegality of the act is subject to the 
canceling effect. After all, we might construe the agent as under pressure, when consider-
ing what will happen if he rejects T1, to take into consideration what his future selves 
will do given the choices they will face. It would be irrational for him, we might say, to 
imagine that there is no more to the question of what to do than what to do now; it would 
be irrational to be entirely temporally myopic. Or, to put the point a slightly different 
way, we might say that the relevant question before him when facing T1 is what the con-
ditional probability is that he will act illegally if he accepts the temptation — roughly, 
100 percent — in comparison to the conditional probability that he will act illegally if he 
rejects the temptation — which, given that the government is tracking his performance 
and is determined to find the right temptation, is, also, roughly 100 percent.34  Since the 
two conditional probabilities are the same, the illegality of the act is subject to the cancel-
ing effect. These are reasons for thinking that no rationally relevant information is repre-
sented in the extended form diagram that is not also represented in the normal form dia-
gram; the fact that each choice the agent makes is between performing an illegal act and 
refraining from performance doesn’t capture the nature of the pressures on his delibera-
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tion. However, even if there is a mistake here — even if extended form is not reducible to 
normal form — there is reason to think that the relevant pressures on deliberation for our 
purposes here are those that are apparent from the normal form representation. The rea-
son is that an agent can surely not be criticized for choosing between temporally extended 
courses of conduct. Perhaps he need not; perhaps he would comply with all of the pres-
sures on deliberation by construing his choice in some other way that is more adequately 
represented in extended form. But for our purposes the question is whether or not the 
agent is under pressure to grant the illegality of the act reason-giving weight; if there is a 
way for him to respond appropriately to all of the relevant pressures on deliberation with-
out doing so, then his deliberations have not failed in the way required for desert of pun-
ishment. 
  
 If the foregoing is right, a judge trying to decide whether or not to 
grant a defendant’s entrapment defense in a case in which it is clear that the 
defendant is not predisposed ought to reason like this: If the defense is de-
nied, then the act is illegal; thus, to deny the defense is to say that punish-
ment is dictated by the law in this circumstance. But if so, then, given the 
government’s willingness to do what was necessary to get the defendant to 
give in, a wide range of actions considered by the defendant were illegal. But 
then the illegality of the act was subject to the canceling effect over that set 
of actions: The defendant was not under as strong legal pressure to grant it 
reason-giving weight as he would have been had the government not tracked 
his performance of an illegal act, since granting the act’s illegality full weight 
would not alter the comparative degree of support by reasons given to the 
various acts he was considering. But then the punishment was not chosen in 
the weak sense, and so would not be brought on the defendant by himself, 
were it to be issued. Therefore, punishing him is appropriate only if he is un-
deserving of the punishment. It follows, given the retributive justification of 
punishment, that he is not to be punished for the act and his entrapment de-
fense is to be honored. Unpredisposed defendants, induced to act through a 
temptation issued by the government, are not deserving of punishment. 
 It may be clear already why this reasoning does not equally apply to a 
defendant who is tempted by a private party, rather than the government. 
That is, it may already be clear what the argument is for (2) — the claim that 
the illegality of the act of a defendant tempted by a private party, rather than 
the government, is not sufficiently subject to the canceling effect to under-
mine desert of punishment. Private parties do not ordinarily track the per-
formance by an agent of an illegal act, even when they track his compliance 
with the temptation. Ordinarily, that is, a private party may be willing to 
make more and more attractive and tempting offers to commit a crime, but 
he does not do so just in so far as such offers make more likely the possibility 
of the victim’s thereby doing something illegal. There may be coincidence 
between a private party’s sweetening of the pot and the likelihood of the vic-
tim doing something illegal, but there is no design in that connection in the 
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way that there is when the government is doing the tempting. What the ab-
sence of design implies is that when a private party is doing the tempting 
there will be possible temptations that he is willing to issue, the acceptance of 
which will not involve illegal conduct. To see the relevance of this point, 
consider the set of illegal actions that are considered by the agent who is 
tempted by the government and compare it to the analogous set of actions 
considered by the agent who is tempted by a private party. The latter set is 
usually smaller than the former for were a way of legally giving in to the 
temptation to appear, the government would remove the temptation, rescind 
the offer for that act, where the private party would not. The private party 
doesn’t care whether or not the act is illegal, while the government does. In 
fact, were the private party to recognize that an obstacle to the agent’s accep-
tance of the temptation is the illegality of the act he would thereby perform, 
the private might endeavor to find a way for the agent to accept the tempta-
tion without acting illegally. What this means is that the private party’s aims 
do not make the illegality of the defendant’s act nearly as strongly subject to 
the canceling effect as the government’s aims do. 
 To see the point, consider Figure 2. Assume that the private party, 
like the government in our earlier example, is determined to get the defen-
dant to accept a temptation. But assume, also, that the private party tracks 
not the performance of an illegal act on the part of the defendant, but the per-
formance of some act that happens to be illegal. Imagine, for instance, that a com-
pany pedaling child pornography received Jacobson’s name from the same 
list that the FBI used. They, just like the government, send him catalogs in 
order to tempt him to commit a crime, a crime that will put money in their 
pockets. Now imagine that, after a year or so of regular mailings, the law 
against child pornography is changed so that only half, instead of all, of the 
materials advertised in both the government’s and the private party’s catalogs 
are illegal; perhaps the age at which a person is to be considered a minor is 
lowered. The government immediately alters the catalogs that they send to 
Jacobson so that only illegal materials are advertised. Given that it is in the 
business of causing Jacobson to do something illegal, what would be the 
point of continuing to advertise materials that Jacobson has a legal right to 
order? What the government is trying to do by making this change is to en-
sure that as few as possible of the options available to Jacobson are legal. By 
contrast, the private party continues to send Jacobson the same catalogs as 
before; the private party can make the same dollar regardless of the legality or 
illegality of Jacobson’s selections. In Figure 2, imagine that Tn is the tempta-
tion that the private party issues after the laws against child pornography are 
changed; he is providing Jacobson an opportunity to do as he hasbeen 
tempting him to do all along, but to do so legally. The illegality of Jacobson’s 
act, then, is subject to the canceling effect to a greater degree when he is 
tempted by the government than when he is tempted by a private party; in 
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the former case there are a greater range of actions with respect to which his 
deliberations would be unaffected were he to grant no reason-giving force to 
the act’s illegality. Importantly, this result is not specific to this particular ex-
ample. So long as the government is, and the private party is not, aiming at the 
performance by the defendant of an illegal act, there will be possible tempta-
tions that the government would not issue and the private party would and 
that could be accepted without doing anything illegal. This is the solution to 
the problem of private entrapment: Private parties, since they do not track 
the illegality of the acts of those whom they tempt, do not make it the case, 
as the government does, that the illegality of the act is subject to the cancel-
ing effect to the degree necessary to make the defendant undeserving of pun-
ishment. 
 
Figure 2: T1, T2, etc. represent various temptations the private party is prepared to issue 
to the defendant. Black circles represent the performance by the defendant of an illegal 
act, while white circles represent performance of a legal act. 
 
 Notice that, as described, the difference between the government and 
the private temptor is a difference in what they would actually do at some 
point in the future of the temptation that the defendant actually accepted. 
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Now this difference is entirely counterfactual; the defendant actually accepts 
T1, the very first temptation issued to him. What the diagrams in Figures 1 
and 2 represent are possibilities. We look at the situation that the defendant 
faced when he accepted the temptation and we ask what he could have ex-
pected under various conditions. What would have happened if he’d rejected 
the first temptation? What would have happened if circumstances down-
stream of that decision were in various ways different from what we expect 
them to have been? What we find is that, when the government is involved, 
more of the answers to these hypothetical questions involve description of 
worlds in which the defendant acts illegally than when a private party is doing 
the tempting. The outcome of acting illegally is more counterfactually robust 
— it occurs across a greater range of relevant possible worlds — when the 
party doing the tempting tracks the performance by the agent of an illegal 
act, as the government ordinarily does. What follows is that the illegality of 
the act is more subject to the canceling effect when the government tempts 
than when a private party does. 
 I have not provided an argument for thinking that this difference in 
degree of subjection of illegality to the canceling effect — the government’s 
actions make it more subject, the private party’s less so — is enough to make 
a difference in desert. Why should we think that the defendant tempted by 
the government is under sufficiently less pressure in deliberation to warrant the 
claim that he did not, and the defendant tempted by a private party did, bring 
the punishment on himself? I don’t have an answer to this question any more 
than I have an account of what degree of pressure to grant reason-giving 
force to the act’s illegality is necessary to warrant the thought that the defen-
dant brought the punishment on himself. Still, the theory on offer bears suf-
ficient fruit even without an answer to this question. What it provides is an 
explanation for why there should be a difference in culpability between those 
tempted by the government and those tempted by private parties, even if it 
doesn’t show that always and in general this difference will be found. There 
are undoubtedly cases in which the government is not terribly zealous — 
they don’t track the defendant’s performance of an illegal act very well; and, 
conversely, there may be cases in which private parties really do track such 
performance. If there are such cases, then they would fall on the opposite 
side of the line than one might initially expect.  
 It’s important to highlight an admission that has just been made. On 
the view presented here, it is the tracking of illegal action on the part of a 
temptor that undermines the tempted’s culpability for compliance. It is a con-
tingent matter that the government tracks in this way and private parties do 
not. To some, the contingency of connection between government tempta-
tion and the kinds of temptation that undermine desert of legal punishment 
appears to undermine the solution to the problem of private entrapment on 
offer. If the position advocated here is right, shouldn’t we have a “tracking” 
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defense, rather than an entrapment defense? Shouldn’t defendants have to 
show that whoever supplied the temptation they accepted was tracking their 
performance of an illegal act?35  The question to ask about this objection, 
however, is not whether it traces out the implications of the argument here 
correctly — it does — but whether the results the objector points to amount 
to objections. I explain.  
 The solution to the problem of private entrapment offered here does 
imply that a party who tracks performance of an illegal act by the defendant 
with sufficient zeal does makes the illegality of the act subject to the cancel-
ing effect and so undermines the defendant’s culpability for it. Since culpabil-
ity is necessary for legal responsibility, it follows that some who accept temp-
tations issued by private parties ought not to be convicted. Imagine, for in-
stance, a child advocacy organization that, fed up with the FBI’s paltry ef-
forts, takes it on itself to tempt would-be consumers of child porn into pur-
chasing such materials so as to make prosecution of them possible. On the 
view defended here, if such an organization really tracks the performance of 
an illegal act on the part of the defendant, and if it really does it with suffi-
cient zeal to strongly subject the act’s illegality to the canceling effect, the de-
fendant is not culpable for having accepted the temptation. What this implies 
is that the fact that it is the government that issued the temptation is not of 
substantive importance to the defense, but of profound probative importance. 
That is, given the way the police does business, and given how much power 
they have, we think it extraordinarily likely that a government temptor tracks 
performance of an illegal act on the part of the defendant. And given how 
common it is to find private parties who want others to do things that hap-
pen to be illegal, but don’t particularly care that they are illegal (think of drug 
traffickers, for instance), it is extraordinarily likely that private temptors do 
not track illegal action per se. Thus, the fact that the government issued the 
temptation, rather than a private party, is of overwhelming evidentiary sig-
nificance. It is significant enough, in fact, as to make the showing of that fact 
alone sufficient under certain circumstances to grant the defense. When an 
unpredisposed defendant shows that the government tempted him, he shows 
it to be so likely that his culpability was undermined as to make the risk of 
wrongful conviction far too high for the government to proceed with convic-
tion and punishment. No comparable risk is present when a private party 
tempts, and so there is no defense of private entrapment. 
 Return, briefly, to the disagreement between advocates of the Subjec-
tive and Objective tests. Nothing said here can adjudicate the dispute be-
tween these two parties. Rather, both can benefit from the solution to the 
problem of private entrapment just offered. It is obvious, perhaps, how an 
advocate of the Subjective Test can use the argument just offered: If the ar-
gument works, it shows that the defense is to be granted just when the Sub-
jective Test says it should be, for it shows that just those defendants who are 
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tempted by the government and unpredisposed are not culpable for their 
acts. But, in fact, the argument can be accepted also by someone who de-
fends the Objective Test, particularly in the form offered in the Model Penal 
Code, according to which, recall, government temptation amounts to miscon-
duct just in case it risks ensnaring the unpredisposed. Someone who advo-
cates this position can agree that what's bad about risking ensnaring the un-
predisposed is that when the government succeeds in ensnaring such a per-
son, it ensnares someone who's not culpable. And such a person can agree 
that someone who is ensnared by a private party, even if unpredisposed, is 
still culpable for the reasons offered here. And, further, such a person can 
agree that when the government ensnares the predisposed it ensnares some-
one culpable. But the advocate of such a position can further insist that none 
of this means that we ought to grant the defense only to the unpredisposed. 
In fact, it might be argued, it is so bad to ensnare the unculpable, that we’re 
going to grant the defense anytime the government even risks that, and even 
in cases in which, we admit, the defendant is culpable. The argument be-
tween the advocate of the Subjective Test and someone who accepts the 
Model Penal Code’s test, supplemented by the offered solution to the problem 
of private entrapment, then, reduces to a debate very close in structure to the 
debate over the exclusionary rule: Both sides admit that, for instance, the 
practice of excluding coerced confessions from evidence results in some 
guilty people going free, but one side, and not the other, thinks this is worth 
it to minimize the risk of false conviction on the strength of coerced confes-
sions. Thus, the debate between advocates of the Subjective and Objective 
tests can’t be settled by appeal to the views’ respective abilities to solve the 
problem of private entrapment, but must be settled, if it can be, through 
consideration of the normative question of what limitations on government 





 It is worth highlighting two results, both of which are strongly sug-
gested by the central claim of this paper, the claim that there is a difference in 
culpability between those who give in to government-supplied temptation, 
and those who give in to temptation supplied by a private party. The first 
result is this: Repeatedly, courts identify one particular feature of government 
conduct as objectionable in explaining their decision to honor an entrapment 
defense: the government’s dogged persistence to cause the defendant to act 
in the way banned by the law.36  But why should it matter that the govern-
ment is persistent in its efforts? Private parties, too, can be persistent in their 
efforts, yet we don’t grant a defense to those who act criminally as a result of 
such persistence. The discussion here explains why governmental persistence, 
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in particular, matters: The government is not simply persistently trying to get 
the entrapped to act in a certain way; it is trying to get him to act criminally. 
What it is persistent about is the criminality of the defendant’s conduct. But 
what this means is that the illegality of the defendant’s act becomes inevitable 
for that defendant in a way that undermines the defendant’s deserving of 
punishment. 
 The second, and more philosophically important moral to be drawn 
from this discussion, concerns the role of mental states in culpability assess-
ments. It is natural to think that a defendant’s legal culpability is entirely a 
matter of the mental states of the defendant, the mental states that in some 
way contributed to the performance of the acts of which the defendant is 
accused. (Such an assumption is apparent in the very naming of the Subjec-
tive Test, as though in assessing culpability we need only consider those facts 
that are immediately accessible to the subject, namely mental states, which 
are not so easily accessible from a third-person point of view.)  But if the 
conclusion of this paper is correct, this is a mistake. Governmentally and pri-
vately tempted defendants have exactly the same sorts of mental states; both 
have their reasons for wanting to do something that the law bans, and both, 
typically, believe themselves to be given an opportunity to act criminally by a 
private party. Since, as has been argued, they differ in culpability, culpability 
is not solely a matter of mental state.37  This result, in turn, has implications 
for the ongoing philosophical project of specifying necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the possession of the sort of freedom needed for responsibil-
ity. If there is more to culpability than mental state, then it seems unlikely 
that an analysis of the concept of freedom can be adequate if it appeals only 
to the mental states of the free agent.38  Theorists concerned with the so-
called “free will problem,” then, would do well to turn their thoughts to the 
foundations of the entrapment defense and the inevitable problem of private 
entrapment.39 
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1 Genesis 3:13 
 
2 For an extremely helpful overview of the historical development of the entrapment de-
fense, see Rebecca Roiphe, “The Serpent Beguiled Me: A History of the Entrapment De-
fense,” 33 Seton Hall L. Rev. 257 (2003). 
 
3 There is no “problem” of private entrapment if privately entrapped people ought to be 
excused under just the same conditions as the governmentally entrapped. This is claimed 
in Ronald J. Allen, Melissa Luttrell and Anne Kreeger, “Clarifying Entrapment,” 89 J. 
Crim. L. & Criminology 407 (1999). Allen, Luttrell and Kreeger claim that the entrap-
ment defense should be granted just in case the temptor has offered higher than market-
level inducements to commit the crime. Since either a private party or the government 
can provide such inducements, a defendant’s responsibility is undermined in either case. 
It seems to me, however, that the right response to this is to affirm modus tolens: Given 
that the privately entrapped ought not to be granted a defense, it follows that defendants 
shouldn’t be excused simply on the grounds that they received higher than market-level 
inducements to perform. 
 
4 Concern with the problem can be seen in recent cases as well. For instance, in United 
States v. Gendron (18 F.3d 955 (1994 U.S. App.)) the point is raised bluntly: “[W]ere the 
issue simply the defendant’s state of mind…the law would permit an innocent minded 
defendant to raise an entrapment claim when a private person ‘induced’ him…to commit 
a crime. But the law does not authorize the defense in those instances, however ‘outra-
geous’ the private person’s conduct.”  See also United States v. Russell (411 U. S. 423 
(1973)), and Sherman v. United States (356 U. S. 369 (1958)). In both of those cases the 
minority objects to the majority’s ruling by appeal to the problem of private entrapment. 
Relatedly, Christopher D. Moore argues that the problem of private entrapment consti-
tutes a profound difficulty for the entrapment defense. See, Christopher D. Moore, “The 
Elusive Foundation of the Entrapment Defense,” 89 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1151 (1995), esp. p. 
1157. 
 
5  This is not the first paper to try to solve the problem. Roger Park tries to solve the prob-
lem by arguing that the privately entrapped and the governmentally entrapped are equally 
innocent, but that there are reasons of public policy for denying the defense to the pri-
vately entrapped. (See Roger Park, “The Entrapment Controversy,” in Minnesota Law 
Review, v. 60, 1976.)  Park’s position on this issue is convincingly attacked in Andrew 
Altman and Stephen Lee, “Legal Entrapment,” in Philosophy and Public Affairs, v. 12 
(1), 1982, pp. 51-69, esp. pp. 58-9. For further discussion, see Michael Gorr, “Entrap-
ment, Due Process and the Perils of ‘Pro-Active’ Law Enforcement,” in Public Affairs 
Quarterly, v. 13 (1), 1999, pp. 1-24, esp. p. 13. The primary problem with Park’s ap-
proach, as Altman and Lee point out, is that the fact that a person is privately entrapped 
does not serve to morally exculpate quite independently of the particular policy-entwined 
purposes of a legal defense. In other words, there appears to be something peculiarly ap-
propriate about convicting the privately entrapped, and not the governmentally entrapped, 
even when we confine our gaze to particular cases and not, as we do when bringing in 
policy considerations, to the aggregate of cases. A true solution to the problem of private 
entrapment needs to explain why the privately entrapped are not, and the governmentally 
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entrapped are, rightly subject to legal punishment quite independently of extrinsic policy 
considerations. 
 
6 On occasion, the line between government agent and private party is not so clear. For 
instance, in United States v. Manzella (791 F.2d 1263 (1986 U.S. App.)), a DEA agent 
convinced a man named Rizzo, who had no connection to the government, to sell him 
some cocaine. Rizzo brought the deal to the defendant, Manzella, who sold the cocaine to 
the agent, with Rizzo acting as intermediary. Manzella claimed that he was entrapped. 
The court rejected the defense on the grounds that Rizzo was not working for the gov-
ernment. 
 
7 Normally, in order to show that he has been entrapped, a defendant must show that he 
was “induced” to act by the government. Sometimes the term “inducement” is used in an 
evaluatively loaded way to mean not just that the government tempted the defendant into 
acting, but that in doing so it acted badly or inappropriately. Since, as we will see, one of 
the central questions about entrapment is whether or not it is important to know if the 
government acted badly toward the defendant, it is important to have an evaluatively neu-
tral term to capture the role the government plays in all the cases that concern us. For our 
purposes, then, to say that the government tempted the defendant to perform the crime, 
and that the defendant acted as he did in response to its temptation, is not to imply any-
thing about whether or not the government overstepped its bounds in issuing the tempta-
tion. 
 
8 As Kyron Huigens helped me to see, the term “culpable” is sometimes used differently 
from the way it is being used here. It is sometimes used as a status term, to refer to those 
who are, we might say, normatively competent or who are possessed with the basic set of 
capacities that qualify one to be asked to meet legal demands. As the term is being used 
here, however, it picks out agents only in so far as they stand in a certain (somewhat ob-
scure) relation to a particular act. The term is being used here in the sense of “culpability 
for” a particular act and not as a way of identifying a particular status of the agent inde-
pendently of any particular action. 
 
9 These cases are: Casey v. United States (276 U. S. 413 (1928)), Sorrells v. United States 
(287 U. S. 435 (1932)), Sherman v. United States (356 U. S. 369 (1958)), United States v. 
Russell (411 U. S. 423 (1973)), Hampton v. United States (425 U. S. 484 (1976)), Jacob-
son v. United States (503 U.S. 540 (1992)). 
 
10 The distinction appears starkly in Sorrells v. United States (287 U. S. 435 (1932)). 
Writing for the majority, Justice Hughes says that the “controlling question” is “whether 
the defendant is a person otherwise innocent whom the Government is seeking to punish 
for an alleged offense which is the product of the creative activity of its own officials.”  
And thus, he concludes, the defendant who adopts an entrapment defense makes himself 
subject to a “searching inquiry into his own conduct and predisposition,” By contrast, 
Justice Roberts, writing for the minority, says that cases of entrapment involve a “prosti-
tution of the criminal law” on the part of the government and that to grant an entrapment 
defense is in fact to judge a defendant to be “not guilty by reason of someone else’s im-
proper conduct.” 
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11 In fact, talk of “predisposition” did not enter until after Woo Wai was decided. Rather, 
in Woo Wai, the court ruled that given that Woo Wai would not have, in the ordinary 
course of things, encountered circumstances that would have prompted him to commit 
similar acts, that he was “otherwise innocent” prior to being subject to temptation by the 
government. For our purposes, however, the point is the same. 
 
12 In United States v. Gendron (18 F.3d 955), the court proposes a general test for deter-
mining if a possible circumstance is “relevant.” Writing for the majority, Judge Breyer 
says: “The right way to ask the question [viz. Subtracting consideration of the govern-
ment’s conduct, would the defendant have otherwise committed the crime?], it seems to 
us, is to abstract away from — to assume away — the present circumstances insofar as 
they reveal government overreaching. That is to say, we should ask how the defendant 
likely would have reacted to an ordinary opportunity to commit the crime.” Breyer’s idea 
is that a counterfactual occasion is relevant so long as it does not involve government 
misconduct. If this test is followed to the letter, then every entrapment defense will be 
denied. After all, we know that the defendant would accept the temptation the govern-
ment supplied even if it hadn’t been supplied by the government; the defendant didn’t 
know that it was the government who was tempting him. And, crucially, an occasion in 
which he is tempted just as he was by a private party is a “relevant” occasion by this 
standard since it does not involve any government misconduct. It thus follows that the 
defendant is predisposed by this standard just by virtue of the fact that he accepted the 
government’s temptation. 
 
13 Thus, what will be argued here is in disagreement with the position of the Model Penal 
Code, which claims, “[T]he defendant whose crime results from an entrapment is neither 
less reprehensible or dangerous, nor more reformable or deterrable, than other defendants 
who are properly convicted.” (Model Penal Code, Commentary on §2.13, v. 1, p. 406).  I 
agree with the Model Penal Code that the defense cannot be justified through appeal to 
the lack of “dangerousness” (special deterrence), “deterrability” (general deterrence), or 
“reformability” (rehabilitation), of those whom it excuses. I disagree, however, that the 
defense cannot be justified through appeal to the relative lack of “reprehensibility” (retri-
bution) of those whom it excuses. That, in any event, is what is to be argued here. 
 
14 Thanks to Scott Altman, Greg Keating and Andrei Marmor for, in different ways, push-
ing lines of thought of this sort. 
 
15 Jonathan C. Carlson also tries to justify the entrapment defense on retributive grounds. 
(See Jonathan C. Carlson, “The Act Requirement and the Foundations of the Entrapment 
Defense”, 73 Va. L. Rev. 1011 (1987).) Carlson claims that in cases in which the entrap-
ment defense is to be honored, no one is harmed, and so no wrong deserving of punish-
ment has been committed. If this justification for the defense were adequate, however, it 
would justify excusing any defendant who is tempted by the government, including the 
predisposed, assuming that the government’s involvement prevented any harm from be-
ing caused. In addition, if such a justification works for entrapment, it undermines the 
justice of any punishment in cases of “victimless” crime. These are unsatisfactory results. 
 
16  This point is raised by the minority in Sorrels v. United States (287 U. S. 435 (1932)): 
“The [Subjective Test], in effect, pivots conviction in such cases, not on the commission 
of the crime charged, but on the prior reputation or some former acts of the defendant not 
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mentioned in the indictment.”  See, also, discussion in B. Grant Stitt and Gene G. James, 
“Entrapment: An Ethical Analysis,” in Moral Issues in Police Work, F. Elliston and M. 
Feldberg eds., Allentown: Rowman and Allanheld, 1985, pp. 129-145, esp. p. 133. 
Feinberg discusses a closely related concern. See  Joel Feinberg, “Causing Voluntary 
Actions,” in Doing and Deserving, Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1970, pp. 175-
6. 
 
17  Joel Feinberg makes the following remark: “[T]he predisposed criminal is no less 
guilty for being induced to act by a policeman in a disguise than thousands of others of 
like disposition who are induced by private persons.” (Joel Feinberg, “Causing Voluntary 
Actions,” in Doing and Deserving, Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1970, p. 176)  
Feinberg is not quite giving voice to the claim that the Subjective Test faces the problem 
of private entrapment, for he is insisting on the fact that there is no difference between 
those the Subjective Test condemns (the predisposed) and those who are tempted by pri-
vate parties and who our law denies the defense of entrapment. By contrast, the problem 
of private entrapment arises because it appears that there is no difference between those 
the Subjective Test excuses (the unpredisposed) and those who are privately entrapped. It 
is this latter appearance, and not the one to which Feinberg points, that, if more than an 
appearance, threatens the Subjective Test. George Fletcher stresses the point: “There is 
no single theory of the [entrapment] defense that can explain both (1) the exclusion of 
entrapment by private parties and (2) the limitation to suspects not ‘predisposed’ to 
commit the offense.”  (George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law, Oxford University 
Press: Oxford, 2000, p. 543.)  Section 4 of this paper offers just the sort of theory that 
Fletcher denies to be possible. 
 
18 In fact, the Model Penal Code justifies its choice of an Objective Test through appeal 
to the problem of private entrapment: “Defendants who are aided, solicited, deceived or 
persuaded by police officials stand in the same moral position as those who are aided, 
solicited, deceived or persuaded by other persons; yet no one suggests a general defense 
for the latter.” (Model Penal Code, Commentary on §2.13, v. 1, p. 406). In this, the 
Model Penal Code echoes the view expressed by Justice Stewart in his dissenting opinion 
in United States v. Russell (411 U. S. 423 (1973)), in which a plea is made for some ver-
sion of the Objective Test: “That [the defendant] was induced, provoked or tempted to do 
so by government agents does not make him any more innocent or any less predisposed 
than he would be if he had been induced, provoked or tempted by a private person — 
which, of course, would not entitle him to cry ‘entrapment.’”  For some discussion, see 
Michael Gorr, “Entrapment, Due Process and the Perils of ‘Pro-Active’ Law Enforce-
ment,” in Public Affairs Quarterly, v. 13 (1), 1999, pp. 1-24, esp. pp. 12-13. Gorr de-
scribes the problem of private entrapment as “the single most powerful criticism of any 
view which includes a subjective element focusing on the defendant’s predisposition.” (p. 
13) 
 
19 Gerald Dworkin offers a similar version of the Objective Test. (See Gerald Dworkin, 
“The Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat: Entrapment and the Creation of Crime,” in Law 
and Philosophy, v. 4, 1985, pp. 17-39, esp. p. 33.) According to Dworkin, a government-
issued temptation is acceptable (and thus the defendant’s entrapment defense should be 
denied) only if the government had probable cause to believe that the defendant was al-
ready engaged, or intended to be engaged in criminal activity. Dworkin offers a higher 
standard for predisposition than that presented in the Subjective Test here — the defen-
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dant must actually have been involved in criminal activity, the counterfactual possibility 
of such engagement is not enough. Also, Dworkin can be thought of as unpacking the 
Model Penal Code’s notion of “risk of ensnaring the unpredisposed”; under Dworkin’s 
view, the government is guilty of creating such a risk just in case it lacked probable cause 
to believe the defendant to be involved in criminal activity. The differences, however, 
between Dworkin’s approach and that of the Model Penal Code are not significant 
enough, so far as I can see, to provide Dworkin a way of avoiding the criticism of the 
Model Penal Code’s approach offered in the main text. 
 
20 The court creates some confusion by claiming that there is good evidence that Jacobson 
had a “predisposition to view photographs of preteen sex” (Majority opinion in Jacob-
son). The court, however, is careful to distinguish that predisposition from a predis-
postion to order child pornography through the mail, the crime of which Jacobson was 
accused. This confusing aspect of the opinion has generated a great deal of discussion of 
Jacobson. See, for instance, J. Gregory Deis, “Economics, Causation, and the Entrapment 
Defense,” U. Ill. L. Rev. 1207 (2001); Paul Marcus, “Presenting, Back from the (Almost) 
Dead, the Entrapment Defense,” 47 Fla. L. Rev. 205 (1995); Lance Levy, “Criminal Law 
— The ‘Sting’ of Government Operations: An Analysis of Predisposition as it Relates to 
the Entrapment Defense — Jacobson v. United States,” 26 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 1177 
(1992); Brian Thomas Feeney, “Scrutiny for the Serpent: The Court Refines Entrapment 
Law in Jacobson v. United States,” 42 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1027 (1993); Nancy Y. T. Hane-
wicz, “Jacobson v. United States: The Entrapment Defense and Judicial Supervision of 
the Criminal Justice System,” Wis. L. Rev. 1163 (1993); Jack B. Harrison, “The Gov-
ernment as Pornographer: Government Sting Operations and Entrapment”, 61 U. Cin. L. 
Rev. 1067 (1993); Eric Weyand, “Entrapment: From Sorrels to Jacobson — The Devel-
opment Continues,” 20 Ohio N.U.L. Rev. 293 (1993). 
 
21 Damon D. Camp claims that there would be something wrong if a hypothetical Jacob-
son, who was pursuing child pornography aggressively and for prurient reasons, had ac-
cess to the entrapment defense. (See Damon D. Camp, “Out of the Quagmire After Ja-
cobson v. United States: Towards a More Balanced Entrapment Standard,” in the Journal 
of Criminal Law and Criminology, v. 83, 1993, pp. 1092-93.) Gendron, real and not hy-
pothetical, is just such a person. 
 
22 For discussion of an earlier draft of the Model Penal Code’s test, a discussion which 
expresses a related criticism to that offered here, see Joel Feinberg, “Causing Voluntary 
Actions,” in Doing and Deserving, Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1970, p. 174, n. 
22. 
 
23 This claim is closely related, it seems, to the claim made by Christopher D. Moore to 
the effect that even the Objective Test, to be plausible, must focus on the defendant’s 
predisposition or lack thereof. See Christopher D. Moore, “The Elusive Foundation of the 
Entrapment Defense,” 89 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1151, esp. pp. 1172-77. 
 
24 My thinking about this was inspired by some remarks of Martin Stone’s. 
 
25 The Model Penal Code includes entrapment by estoppel by offering the following suf-
ficient (but not necessary) condition for entrapment: A defendant is entrapped if he acted 
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as a result of the government “making knowingly false representations designed to induce 
the belief that such conduct is not prohibited.” (Model Penal Code §2.13(1)(a)). 
 
26 It needn’t involve the sort of mistake of law that constitutes a defense under Model 
Penal Code §2.04(3), for instance. 
 
27 This seems to be just what Gerald Dworkin has in mind: “[F]or a law enforcement offi-
cial to encourage, suggest or invite crime is to, in effect, be saying ‘Do this.’ It is cer-
tainly unfair to the citizen to be invited to do that which the law forbids him to do. But it 
is more than unfair; it is conceptually incoherent…From the standpoint of one trying to 
understand and evaluate the system…the conflict is clear.” (Gerald Dworkin, “The Ser-
pent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat: Entrapment and the Creation of Crime,” in Law and 
Philosophy, v. 4, 1985, p. 32) 
 
28 Thanks to Herbert Morris for the example. 
 
29 Thanks to Mark Greenberg for the example. 
 
30 Why? In broadstrokes, one possible answer is that the different pressures on delibera-
tion derive in the end from different forms of flourishing of our deliberative mechanisms. 
You ought to consider the means to your intended ends because by doing so you can get 
closer to realizing a certain ideal: the ideal of the rational deliberator. Similarly, by grant-
ing reason-giving force to the immorality or illegality of an act you can get closer to real-
izing ideals of moral and legal deliberation, respectively. But since there is no reason to 
expect all of these ideals to be realizable at once, there is no reason to expect reasons of 
different sorts to cancel one another. 
 
31 A consequence can be subject to the canceling effect to some degree, in this first sense, 
also, when the probability of its occurrence, given performance of a certain action, is less 
than one. For instance, imagine that act A is guaranteed to result in a $100 loss, while act 
B has a probability of doing so of 40 percent. Thus, the expected loss for performing act 
B is not $100, but $100 * .4 = $40. Therefore, the $100 loss attaching to act A is some-
what subject to the canceling effect; the agent is under prudential pressure to treat it as a 
$60 loss. 
 
32 There is an affinity between the explanation being offered here and the explanation that 
I give elsewhere for the claim that coercion and indoctrination, as opposed to neutral 
forces that give the agent just as bad a choice to make, undermine freedom of will. See 
Gideon Yaffe, “Indoctrination, Coercion, and Freedom of Will” in Philosophy and Phe-
nomenological Research, v. 67, n. 2, September 2003, pp. 335-356. 
 
33 The elaboration to follow owes a great deal to discussion with Scott Shapiro. 
 
34 Thanks to Alex Stein for pointing out the relevance of conditional probability to the 
point at issue here. 
 
35 Thanks to Andrei Marmor and Martin Stone for independently pushing this objection 
in conversation. 
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36 To take just a few examples, see United States v. Rodriguez (858 F.2d 809 (1988 U.S. 
App.)), United States v. Kessee (992 F.2d 1001 (9th Cir. 1993)), United States v. Gendron 
(18 F.3d 955 (1994 U.S. App.)). 
 
37 This conclusion is probably consistent with the view of Christopher D. Moore, accord-
ing to which the entrapment defense is inherently inconsistent with the standard doctrine 
of excuses. (See Christopher D. Moore, “The Elusive Foundation of the Entrapment De-
fense,” 89 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1151.)  If Moore is right that whether or not a defendant has an 
excuse is a function of his mental state, then the point being made here is the same. For 
discussion, see Michael Gorr, “Entrapment, Due Process and the Perils of ‘Pro-Active’ 
Law Enforcement,” in Public Affairs Quarterly, v. 13 (1), 1999, pp. 1-24, esp. pp. 13-15. 
 
38  Perhaps the most prominent (not to mention important and insightful) analysis of the 
concept that makes this mistake is that offered by Harry Frankfurt in a series of con-
nected papers beginning with “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person” in The 
Importance of What We Care About, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1971, pp. 
11-25. 
 
39 Portions of this material were presented at the California Institute of Technology, the 
University of California at Riverside, the UCLA Legal Theory Workshop, the University 
of Southern California School of Law and Cardozo Law School. Thanks are owed to au-
diences on all five occasions for helpful remarks. In addition, all of the following people 
have provided extremely helpful comments: Scott Altman, Michael Bratman, Bill 
Bracken, David Dolinko, Sharon Dolovich, Gerald Dworkin, Steve Finlay, John Fischer, 
Peter Graham, Mark Greenberg, Barbara Herman, Pamela Hieronymi, Paul Hoffman, 
Kyron Huigens, Greg Keating, Andrei Marmor, Herbert Morris, Calvin Normore, Scott 
Shapiro, Paul Shupack, Alex Stein, Nomi Stolzenberg, Martin Stone and Gary Watson. 
 
